Английская Википедия:2017 Washington train derailment

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On December 18, 2017, Amtrak Cascades passenger train 501 derailed near DuPont, Washington, United States. The National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) final report said regional transit authority Sound Transit failed to take steps to mitigate a curve at the accident location, and inadequately trained the train engineer. The train was making the inaugural run of the Point Defiance Bypass, a new passenger rail route south of Tacoma, Washington, operated by Amtrak in partnership with state and local authorities in Oregon and Washington, on right-of-way owned and operated by Sound Transit. The bypass was intended to reduce congestion and separate passenger and freight traffic, and was designed for faster speeds and shorter travel times, saving ten minutes from Seattle to Portland compared with the previous route used by Cascades.

The lead locomotive and all twelve cars derailed at 07:33 a.m. local time while approaching a bridge over Interstate 5 (I-5). The trailing locomotive remained on the rails. A number of automobiles on southbound I-5 were crushed, and three people on board the train died. The train derailed a short distance from where the new route merged with the previous route.

Preliminary information from the data recorder showed that, when the incident happened, the train was traveling at Шаблон:Convert, nearly Шаблон:Convert over the speed limit.

Background

Файл:2017 Washington train derailment overview map.jpg

Overview of new Amtrak Cascades inland route (red; to the south), showing accident location, and old shoreline route (green; to the north)

The Point Defiance Bypass was built from 2010 to 2017 as a replacement for the BNSF mainline that runs along the Puget Sound coast between the Nisqually River and Tacoma. The $181 million bypass, using an inland route that follows I-5, was built by the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) on right of way owned by Sound Transit, the regional transit authority. The Amtrak Cascades service is a joint effort of WSDOT and Oregon Department of Transportation, with Amtrak as a contracting operator. In the wake of the December 18 derailment, the safety of the bypass was questioned by elected officials. The 2006 Cascades corridor plan recommended that the curve and overpass where the derailment occurred be replaced with a straighter alignment, costing $412 million. The final plans omitted the overpass replacement, with a smaller budget of $180 million granted for the entire project.

According to multiple reports, days before the derailment, engineers and conductors warned their supervisors that they did not feel adequately trained on the new route, reporting rushed and "totally inadequate" training such that they felt dangerously unprepared.

Derailment

Файл:2017WashingtonDerailmentSchematicSiteOverview a en.png

Schematic site overview. The lead locomotive is the leftmost vehicle and stopped in the southbound lanes of Interstate 5. The train's rear locomotive is top-right. One car lies inverted under the bridge (shown in blue).

At 07:33 a.m. local time (15:33 UTC), the leading locomotive and twelve cars of the southbound Amtrak Cascades number 501 passenger train derailed southwest of DuPont. DuPont is about Шаблон:Cvt south of Seattle and about Шаблон:Cvt south of the Joint Base Lewis–McChord (JBLM) main gate. The train derailed while approaching the railroad bridge across southbound I-5 near Mounts Road, which contains a left-hand bend.

The lead locomotive, the then brand-new Siemens Charger No. 1402, and six rail cars, went down the embankment to the west of the bridge (to the train's right, in the original direction of travel). The locomotive ended up on I-5 and spilled about Шаблон:Cvt of fuel. Two further cars ended up on the bridge span, and three cars went off the railroad bridge abutment on the opposite side, some onto I-5. Only the trailing General Electric Genesis P42DC locomotive, No. 181, remained on the tracks. Seven vehicles, including two trucks, were damaged by the derailed cars of the train.

The southbound train was operating from Seattle, Washington to Portland, Oregon, on the first revenue service run of the Cascades on the new, faster Point Defiance Bypass route between Lacey and Tacoma. The train was running about 30 minutes behind schedule. Amtrak CEO Richard Anderson said that positive train control was not active on the track, a factor cited in two accidents in Spuyten Duyvil and in Port Richmond, Philadelphia.

Casualties

There were five Amtrak employees, a technician from train manufacturer Talgo, and 77 passengers on board the train at the time of the derailment. Three passengers were killed while 57 more passengers and crew members were injured. Eight road vehicles were damaged in the accident. Of the ten people in them, eight were injured. All three deceased were in the seventh coach of the train. Ten of the injured were in serious condition, and thirteen had moderate or minor injuries. In total, more than 80 people were injured. Treatment was provided at hospitals including Madigan Army Medical Center at JBLM, Providence St. Peter Hospital in Olympia, St. Anthony Hospital in Gig Harbor, Tacoma General Hospital, Good Samaritan Hospital in Puyallup, and St. Clare Hospital in Lakewood. Three soldiers from JBLM, including a Madigan Army Medical Center nurse, left their vehicles to give medical assistance to people trapped inside the train cars, and help them escape.

The three passengers killed in the derailment were train enthusiasts, including two members of rail advocacy group All Aboard Washington.

Aftermath

Файл:2017 Washington train derailment detour routes.png

WSDOT-recommended detour routes on the evening of December 18 extended more than Шаблон:Cvt for the northern route with a travel time over 90 minutes, or alternatively, a southern route of Шаблон:Cvt, with a travel time over 2 hours. Under normal conditions, driving Шаблон:Cvt from Tacoma to Olympia takes about 30 minutes.

Amtrak temporarily suspended service for south of Seattle for several hours because of the accident, resuming on the former coast route and the old Tacoma station. Southbound automobile traffic was rerouted away from I-5 by WSDOT until the site was cleared of debris and inspected. On December 18, JBLM allowed southbound traffic through from DuPont to State Route 510 near Lacey.

WSDOT announced on December 21 that it would not resume Amtrak service on the Point Defiance Bypass until positive train control was implemented in 2018. The accident caused at least $40 million in damage, including the cost of the trainset, damage to vehicles, and damage to the overpass.

Cleanup and freeway reopening

Some of the wrecked train cars were removed by trucks on December 19. Two southbound lanes of I-5 were reopened on December 20, with a reduced speed limit, as the cleanup and investigation continued. By the morning of December 21, all lanes of the freeway had been reopened.

Fate of rolling stock

Файл:WDTX 1402 (1) postderailment position.jpg

Damage to the locomotive after the crash.

Locomotive WDTX 1402 was damaged beyond repair and scrapped, while Locomotive AMTK 181 was undamaged and returned to service. Mt. Adams, the WSDOT-owned Talgo Series VI passenger trainset, was also damaged beyond repair. The NTSB later said that the use of these trainsets should be discontinued "as soon as possible". This led WSDOT and Amtrak to retire and scrap the remaining Talgo VI trainsets. The sets will be replaced with new Siemens Venture train sets.

Response

Within hours of the derailment, Governor Jay Inslee declared a state of emergency and activated the Washington Military Department's emergency operations center at Camp Murray, adjacent to JBLM, to coordinate the multi-agency response to the incident.

A civilian support and reunification center was set up at DuPont City Hall. The Bloodworks Northwest blood bank called for donors after the crash.

President Donald Trump said on Twitter a few hours after the accident that the derailment shows that his "soon to be submitted infrastructure plan must be passed quickly." He said "several trillion dollars" were spent in the Middle East while the transport infrastructure "crumble[s]". A second tweet said his "thoughts and prayers are with everyone", and he thanked first responders. The Associated Press and The New York Times reports of Trump's tweets said the accident had occurred on newly constructed track that was part of a recently upgraded line. The New York Times added that this project was part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, an act signed by President Barack Obama that aimed to address infrastructure shortfalls.

The New York Times editorial board said that the derailment is symptomatic of the Federal Government's failure to invest in infrastructure. It said that despite Trump seemingly acknowledging the problem, his administration's $630 million budget cuts to Amtrak, and a proposed plan to shift infrastructure costs down to state and local governments, would only serve to aggravate the problem.

Amtrak fired the train's engineer, Steven J. Brown, for violating safety rules; however, Brown subsequently filed suit against Amtrak for his injuries, with Amtrak settling his claims. (See, Litigation, below.)

Investigation

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NTSB engineers examine the lead locomotive event recorder two days after the derailment

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) opened an investigation into the accident and dispatched a 20-member Go Team to the crash site. The NTSB said its investigators would be on-site for seven to ten days. One aspect of the investigation was whether the engineer lost situational awareness.

The NTSB said the train was traveling at Шаблон:Cvt at a point soon before it derailed. The speed limit on the curved track segment where the derailment occurred is Шаблон:Cvt, but the preceding track segment north of Mounts Road has a limit of Шаблон:Cvt. The NTSB reported that the train data recorders had been recovered from both locomotives. The lead locomotive recorder showed that the engineer had commented on the train's excessive speed six seconds before the derailment, and applied the brakes. The lead locomotive was traveling at Шаблон:Cvt when recording stopped. A preliminary report into the accident was published on January 4, 2018, and the final report was published on May 21, 2019.

The NTSB found that the crew was attentive and not distracted by conversation or cellular telephones. At the time of accident, there was slight precipitation and it was generally dark outside. Although the engineer knew about the Шаблон:Convert curve ahead, he had missed the single sign that he was going to use as a signal to start slowing down; he also missed two other signs, but one was not used by Amtrak trains, and the other was before the sign he planned to use. Although he did not see the sign at the location where he planned to initiate braking, investigators noted that this sign was highly inconspicuous because it blended in with the signal box directly behind it. Because the engineer only had one operating trip in the dark traveling in the opposite direction, he had not established wayside landmarks to help him identify his location. Such external cues are typically developed by operating crews after they become familiar with their train's territory, and without the use of landmarks, the engineer did not recognize that he had passed signs. Because installation and testing was not complete, a Positive Train Control system was not in operation at the time of the accident, which system would have notified the engineer of his location and speed and would have prevented the accident by stopping the train prior to the 30-mph curve.

As the train approached the curve, the locomotive issued both audible and visual alarms, but the engineer, being new to the Charger locomotive, had to study the console to decipher the alarms. The engineer did not have the opportunity to operate the Charger locomotive during that initial training period and, during the qualification process, observation rides and operating time were not usually performed on the Charger. This limited the engineer's opportunity to experience all elements of the controls, including the audio and visual alerts and alarms. Prior to the derailment, the issued alarms were overspeed warnings: the train was moving faster than 80 mph (130 km/h), the maximum speed on the line. (It was not warning the engineer about approaching the 30-mph curve; the system did not have that capability.) The engineer had never seen or heard the alarms in the Charger associated with an overspeed situation, nor practiced the appropriate response for an overspeed alarm. During the 20 seconds that the engineer took to decipher the audible and visual alarms, he briefly looked outside, but misinterpreted a signal and returned his gaze to the control screens, finally recognizing that he had tripped the overspeed alarm. Diverted by the alarms, he was unaware that he was nearing the curve in the moments prior to the accident, and by the time he recognized the meaning of the alarms he had only about 5 seconds before the train reached the curve. The engineer applied the train's brakes after seeing the final speed sign, immediately north of the curve.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; however, it provided its determination of the probable cause of the derailment, deaths, and injuries, the NTSB stating:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the Amtrak 501 derailment was Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority's failure to provide an effective mitigation for the hazardous curve without positive train control in place, which allowed the Amtrak engineer to enter the 30-mph curve at too high of a speed due to his inadequate training on the territory and inadequate training on the newer equipment. Contributing to the accident was the Washington State Department of Transportation's decision to start revenue service without being assured that safety certification and verification had been completed to the level determined in the preliminary hazard assessment. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the Federal Railroad Administration's decision to permit railcars that did not meet regulatory strength requirements to be used in revenue passenger service, resulting in (1) the loss of survivable space and (2) the failed articulated railcar-to-railcar connections that enabled secondary collisions with the surrounding environment causing severe damage to railcar-body structures which then failed to provide occupant protection resulting in passenger ejections, injuries, and fatalities.

Litigation

More than 35 people sued Amtrak for damages resulting from the derailment. As of April 2022, Amtrak had paid more than $45 million in damages for derailment related injuries.

In January 2020, Brown filed a personal injury lawsuit against Amtrak, claiming that the company failed to properly train him as the engineer to operate the train and to operate over the route, and that they failed to complete installation of Positive Train Control over the route. On March 24, 2021, a judge in Tacoma ruled that Amtrak was strictly liable for the claim of its engineer. By June 2022, Amtrak reached a settlement with Brown compensating him for pain and suffering related to the accident, his lawyer saying that Brown "would be taken care of for life".

See also

• December 2013 Spuyten Duyvil derailment, commuter train that took a curve at far above its posted speed limit
• List of accidents on Amtrak
• List of American railroad accidents
• List of rail accidents (2010–2019)
• Transportation safety in the United States

External links

• Investigation report from NTSB
• Questions and answers about the derailment from WSDOT

  "Amtrak Cascades Train 501, operated by Amtrak, consisted of a Talgo constructed trainset containing 12 cars; (1) one power car, (1) one baggage car, (1) one lounge car, (1) one bistro car, (2) two business class cars, (6) six coach cars. There were (2) two locomotives, one on the front and one on the rear of the train. A standard Talgo coach car contains approximately 36 seats. The Talgo trainset and the Charger locomotive on the front of the train involved in the derailment are owned by WSDOT. Amtrak owns the locomotive on the rear of the train set."

• Шаблон:YouTube
• NTSB Board Meeting: Amtrak Passenger Train 501 Derailment, DuPont, Washington, December 18, 2017, published May 22, 2019.
• USNO Sun positionШаблон:Dead link