Английская Википедия:Begging the question

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In classical rhetoric and logic, begging the question or assuming the conclusion (Latin: Шаблон:Lang) is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion. Historically, begging the question refers to a fault in a dialectical argument in which the speaker assumes some premise that has not been demonstrated to be true. In modern usage, it has come to refer to an argument in which the premises assume the conclusion without supporting it. This makes it more or less synonymous with circular reasoning.

Some examples are:

People have known for thousands of years that the earth is round. Therefore, the earth is round.
Coca Cola is the most popular soft drink in the world. Therefore, no other soft drink is as popular as Coca Cola.

Informal use of the phrase "begs the question" also occurs with an entirely dissimilar sense in place of "prompts a question" or "raises a question".

History

Файл:Aristotle Altemps Inv8575.jpg

Bust of Aristotle, whose Prior Analytics contained an early discussion of this fallacy

The original phrase used by Aristotle from which begging the question descends is Шаблон:Lang, or sometimes Шаблон:Lang, Шаблон:Gloss. Aristotle's intended meaning is closely tied to the type of dialectical argument he discusses in his Topics, book VIII: a formalized debate in which the defending party asserts a thesis that the attacking party must attempt to refute by asking yes-or-no questions and deducing some inconsistency between the responses and the original thesis.

In this stylized form of debate, the proposition that the answerer undertakes to defend is called Шаблон:Gloss (Шаблон:Lang-grc) and one of the rules of the debate is that the questioner cannot simply ask (beg) for it (that would be trivial and uninteresting). Aristotle discusses this in Sophistical Refutations and in Prior Analytics book II, (64b, 34–65a 9, for circular reasoning see 57b, 18–59b, 1).

The stylized dialectical exchanges Aristotle discusses in the Topics included rules for scoring the debate, and one important issue was precisely the matter of asking for the initial thing—which included not just making the actual thesis adopted by the answerer into a question, but also making a question out of a sentence that was too close to that thesis (for example, PA II 16).

The term was translated into English from Latin in the 16th century. The Latin version, Шаблон:Lang Шаблон:Gloss, can be interpreted in different ways. Шаблон:Lang (from Шаблон:Lang), in the post-classical context in which the phrase arose, means Шаблон:Gloss or Шаблон:Gloss, but in the older classical sense means Шаблон:Gloss, Шаблон:Gloss or Шаблон:Gloss. Шаблон:Lang, genitive of Шаблон:Lang, means Шаблон:Gloss, Шаблон:Gloss or Шаблон:Gloss (of an argument). Literally Шаблон:Lang means Шаблон:Gloss or Шаблон:Gloss.

The Latin phrase comes from the Greek Шаблон:Lang (Шаблон:Lang Шаблон:Gloss) in Aristotle's Prior Analytics II xvi 64b28–65a26:

Aristotle's distinction between apodictic science and other forms of nondemonstrative knowledge rests on an epistemology and metaphysics wherein appropriate first principles become apparent to the trained dialectician: Шаблон:Blockquote

Thomas Fowler believed that Шаблон:Lang would be more properly called Шаблон:Lang, which is literally Шаблон:Gloss.

Definition

To Шаблон:Gloss (also called Шаблон:Lang) is to attempt to support a claim with a premise that itself restates or presupposes the claim. It is an attempt to prove a proposition while simultaneously taking the proposition for granted.

When the fallacy involves only a single variable, it is sometimes called a hysteron proteron (Greek for Шаблон:Gloss), a rhetorical device, as in the statement: Шаблон:Blockquote

Reading this sentence, the only thing one can learn is a new word in a more classical style (soporific), for referring to a more common action (induces sleep), but it does not explain why it causes that effect. A sentence attempting to explain why opium induces sleep, or the same, why opium has soporific quality, would be the following one: Шаблон:Blockquote

A less obvious example from Fallacies and Pitfalls of Language: The Language Trap by S. Morris Engel:

This form of the fallacy may not be immediately obvious. Linguistic variations in syntax, sentence structure, and the literary device may conceal it, as may other factors involved in an argument's delivery. It may take the form of an unstated premise which is essential but not identical to the conclusion, or is "controversial or questionable for the same reasons that typically might lead someone to question the conclusion":

For example, one can obscure the fallacy by first making a statement in concrete terms, then attempting to pass off an identical statement, delivered in abstract terms, as evidence for the original. One could also "bring forth a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin", as here:

When the fallacy of begging the question is committed in more than one step, some authors dub it Шаблон:Lang Шаблон:Gloss, or more commonly, circular reasoning.

Begging the question is not considered a formal fallacy (an argument that is defective because it uses an incorrect deductive step). Rather, it is a type of informal fallacy that is logically valid but unpersuasive, in that it fails to prove anything other than what is already assumed.

Related fallacies

Шаблон:Main Closely connected with begging the question is the fallacy of circular reasoning (Шаблон:Lang), a fallacy in which the reasoner begins with the conclusion. The individual components of a circular argument can be logically valid because if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true, and does not lack relevance. However, circular reasoning is not persuasive because a listener who doubts the conclusion also doubts the premise that leads to it.

Begging the question is similar to the complex question (also known as trick question or fallacy of many questions): a question that, to be valid, requires the truth of another question that has not been established. For example, "Which color dress is Mary wearing?" may be fallacious because it presupposes that Mary is wearing a dress. Unless it has previously been established that her outfit is a dress, the question is fallacious because she could be wearing pants instead.

Another related fallacy is ignoratio elenchi or irrelevant conclusion: an argument that fails to address the issue in question, but appears to do so. An example might be a situation where A and B are debating whether the law permits A to do something. If A attempts to support his position with an argument that the law Шаблон:Em to allow him to do the thing in question, then he is guilty of Шаблон:Lang.

Vernacular

In vernacular English, begging the question (or equivalent rephrasing thereof) often occurs in place of "raises the question", "invites the question", "suggests the question", "leaves unanswered the question" etc. Such preface is then followed with the question, as in:

• "[...]Шаблон:Nbsppersonal letter delivery is at an all-time lowШаблон:Nbsp... Which begs the question: are open letters the only kind the future will know?"
• "Hopewell's success begs the question: why aren't more companies doing the same?"
• "Spending the summer traveling around India is a great idea, but it does beg the question of how we can afford it."

Sometimes it is further confused with "dodging the question", an attempt to avoid it, or perhaps more often begging the question is simply used to mean leaving the question unanswered.

See also

• Ambiguity
• Catch-22 (logic)
• Circular definition
• Шаблон:Lang
• Euphemism treadmill
• Шаблон:Slink
• Fallacies of definition
• Open-question argument
• Polysyllogism
• Presuppositional apologetics
• Regress argument (Шаблон:Lang)
• Spin (propaganda)

References

• Cohen, Morris Raphael, Ernest Nagel, and John Corcoran. An Introduction to Logic. Hackett Publishing, 1993. Шаблон:ISBN.
• Davies, Arthur Ernest. A Text-book of Logic. R.G. Adams and Company, 1915.
• Follett, Wilson. Modern American Usage: A Guide. Macmillan, 1966. Шаблон:ISBN.
• Gibson, William Ralph Boyce, and Augusta Klein. The Problem of Logic. A. and C. Black, 1908.
• Herrick, Paul. The Many Worlds of Logic. Oxford University Press, 2000. Шаблон:ISBN
• Kahane, Howard, and Nancy Cavender. Logic and contemporary rhetoric: the use of reason in everyday life. Cengage Learning, 2005. Шаблон:ISBN.
• Kilpatrick, James. "Begging Question Assumes Proof of an Unproved Proposition". Rocky Mountain News (CO) 6 April 1997. Accessed through Access World News on 3 June 2009.
• Martin, Robert M. There Are Two Errors in the Шаблон:Sic Title of This Book: A sourcebook of philosophical puzzles, paradoxes, and problems. Broadview Press, 2002. Шаблон:ISBN.
• Mercier, Charles Arthur. A New Logic. Open Court Publishing Company, 1912.
• Mill, John Stuart. A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive: being a connected view of the principles of evidence, and the methods of scientific investigation. J.W. Parker, 1851.
• Safire, William. "On Language: Take my question please!". The New York Times 26 July 1998. Accessed 3 June 2009.
• Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott. Formal logic, a scientific and social problem. London: Macmillan, 1912.
• Welton, James. "Fallacies incident to the method". A Manual of Logic, Vol. 2. London: W.B. Clive University Tutorial Press, 1905.