Английская Википедия:Chekism
Chekism (Шаблон:Lang-ru) is a term that relates to the situation in the Soviet Union where the secret police strongly controlled all spheres of society. It is also used to point out similar circumstances in post-Soviet intelligence states such as modern Russia.[1][2][3] The term can refer to the system of rule itself, and to the underlying ideology that promotes and popularizes political police violence and arbitrariness against real and imagined enemies of the state.
The name is derived from Cheka, the colloquial name of the first in the succession of Soviet secret police agencies.Шаблон:Efn Employees of Soviet and Russian state security organs have been called Chekists.
Soviet Union
Chekism is described as a product of the set of beliefs, practices, and assumptions in the security police introduced and developed for more than a decade by Felix Dzerzhinsky.[4] The systems he had put in place led to the strengthening of the concept that legitimized and romanticized political terror.[4]
The term Chekism was first defined in a 1950 Russian emigre journal by Soviet defector and Kremlinologist Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, who described the Soviet secret police (here referred to by its older name NKVD) as the backbone of Stalin's dictatorship:
The last KGB Chairman Vadim Bakatin, who was appointed to dismantle the KGB in late 1991 after the failed August Coup, also frequently used the term. In his book "Getting rid of the KGB", published in 1992, he described the origin and meaning of Chekism as follows:
Contemporary Russia
According to former Russian Duma member Konstantin Borovoi, "Putin's appointment is the culmination of the KGB's crusade for power. This is its finale. Now the KGB runs the country."[5] Olga Kryshtanovskaya, director of the Moscow-based Center for the Study of Elites, has found that up to 78% of 1,016 leading political figures in Russia have served previously in organizations affiliated with the KGB or FSB.[6] She said: "If in the Soviet period and the first post-Soviet period, the KGB and FSB people were mainly involved in security issues, now half are still involved in security but the other half are involved in business, political parties, NGOs, regional governments, even culture... They started to use all political institutions."[6]
The KGB or FSB members usually remain in the "acting reserve" even if they formally leave the organization ("acting reserve" members receive a second FSB salary, follow FSB instructions, and remain "above the law" being protected by the organization, according to Kryshtanovskaya[7]). As Vladimir Putin said, "There is no such thing as a former KGB man".[8] Soon after becoming prime minister of Russia, Putin also perhaps somewhat jokingly claimed that "A group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission."[5] Moreover, the FSB has formal membership, military discipline, and an extensive network of civilian informants,[9] hardcore ideology, and support of population (60% of Russians trust FSB[10]Шаблон:Update inline), which according to Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick makes it a perfect totalitarian political party.[11]
Some observers note that the current Russian state security organization FSB is even more powerful than KGB was, because it does not operate under the control of the Communist Party as the KGB in the past.[6] Moreover, the FSB leadership and their partners own the most important economic assets in the country and control the Russian government and the State Duma. According to Ion Mihai Pacepa,
However, the number of FSB staff is a state secret in Russia,[12] and the staff of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces is not officially subordinate to the FSB,[13] although FSB might be interested in monitoring these structures, as they inherently involve state secrets and various degrees of access to them.[14] The Law on the Federal Security Service[15] which defines the FSB's functions and establishes its structure does not specify such tasks as managing strategic branches of national industry, controlling political groups, or infiltrating the federal government.
A political scientist, Stanislav Belkovsky also defines Chekism to be an "imperial ideology" that includes aggressive anti-Americanism.[16]
Andrei Illarionov, a former advisor of Vladimir Putin, describes contemporary Chekism as a new corporatism system, "distinct from any seen in our country before". In this model, members of the Corporation of Intelligence Service Collaborators [Russian abbreviation KSSS] took over the entire body of state power, follow an omerta-like behavior code, and "are given instruments conferring power over others – membership “perks”, such as the right to carry and use weapons". According to Illarionov, this "Corporation has seized key government agencies – the Tax Service, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament, and the government-controlled mass media – which are now used to advance the interests of KSSS members. Through these agencies, every significant resource of the country – security/intelligence, political, economic, informational and financial – is being monopolized in the hands of Corporation members." The ideology of "Chekists" is "Nashism (“ours-ism”), the selective application of rights", he said.[17]
Attitudes toward Chekism in contemporary Russia
Chekists perceive themselves as a ruling class, with political powers transferred from one generation to another. A source cited that chekism created "mafiocracy" in Russia since it is part of corruption and criminality from the outset.[18] Criminals were able to use the Chekist machinery to expand its power.[18] According to a former FSB general, "A Chekist is a breed. ... A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's siloviki. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged".[19]
The head of the Russian Drug Enforcement Administration Viktor Cherkesov said that all Russian siloviks must act as a united front: "We [Chekists] must stay together. We did not rush to power, we did not wish to appropriate the role of the ruling class. But the history commanded so that the weight of sustaining the Russian statehood fell to the large extent on our shoulders... There were no alternatives".[20] Cherkesov also emphasized the importance of Chekism as a "hook" that keeps the entire country from falling apart: "Falling into the abyss the post-Soviet society caught the Chekist hook. And hanged on it.”[21]
Political scientist Yevgenia Albats found such attitudes deplorable: "Throughout the country, without investigation or trial, the Chekists [of an earlier generation] raged. They tortured old men and raped schoolgirls and killed parents before the eyes of their children. They impaled people, beat them with an iron glove, put wet leather 'crowns' on their heads, buried them alive, locked them in cells where the floor was covered with corpses. Amazing, isn't it that today's agents do not blanch to call themselves Chekists, and proudly claim Dzerzhinsky's legacy?"[22]
See also
- Silovik
- Counterintelligence state
- Chronology of Soviet secret police agencies
- Mitrokhin Archive (smuggled records of the KGB)
- Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (a post-Soviet successor organization to the KGB)
- Agents provocateurs
- Agent of influence
- State capture
Notes
References
Further reading
- Russia: Death and resurrection of the KGB By J. Michael Waller, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization
- A Rogue Intelligence State? Why Europe and America Cannot Ignore Russia By Reuel Marc Gerecht
- Putin's Russia, by Anna Politkovskaya
- ↑ The Chekist Takeover of the Russian State, Anderson, Julie (2006), International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 19:2, 237–288.
- ↑ The HUMINT Offensive from Putin's Chekist State Anderson, Julie (2007), International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 20:2, 258–316
- ↑ Шаблон:Cite book
- ↑ 4,0 4,1 Шаблон:Cite book
- ↑ 5,0 5,1 The KGB Rises Again in Russia – by R.C. Paddock – Los Angeles Times, January 12, 2000
- ↑ 6,0 6,1 6,2 In Russia, A Secretive Force Widens – by P. Finn – The Washington Post, 2006
- ↑ Interview with Olga Kryshtanovskaya (Russian) "Siloviks in power: fears or reality?" by Evgenia Albats, Echo of Moscow, 4 February 2006
- ↑ A Chill in the Moscow Air, by Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova, Newsweek, February 6, 2006
- ↑ Slaves of KGB. 20th Century. The religion of betrayal (Рабы ГБ. XX век. Религия предательства) Шаблон:Webarchive, by Yuri Shchekochikhin Moscow, 1999.
- ↑ Archives explosion by Maksim Artemiev, grani.ru, December 22, 2006
- ↑ Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia—Past, Present, and Future. 1994. Шаблон:ISBN.
- ↑ FSB will get new members, the capital will get new land, by Igor Plugataryov and Viktor Myasnikov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2006, (in Russian)
- ↑ Russian Armed Forces Шаблон:Webarchive, official site (in English)
- ↑ The Law on State Secrets, 1997 (in Russian) Шаблон:Webarchive
- ↑ The Law on the Federal Security Service, 2003 (in Russian) Шаблон:Webarchive
- ↑ According to Stanislav Belkovsky, "Chekism is a neo-Soviet imperial ideology and not just a line in a resume." Faking Left, by Stanislav Belkobsky, The St. Petersburg Times
- ↑ Andrei Illarionov: Approaching Zimbabwe (Russian) Partial English translation Шаблон:Webarchive
- ↑ 18,0 18,1 Шаблон:Cite book
- ↑ Russia under Putin. The making of a neo-KGB state., The Economist, August 23, 2007
- ↑ Viktor Cherkesov: KGB is in Fashion? Шаблон:Webarchive, Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 28, 2004 (in Russian)
- ↑ Cherkesov, Viktor. One can't admit the warriors to become traders Шаблон:Webarchive Kommersant #184 (3760), October 9, 2007. (in Russian)English translation Шаблон:Webarchive and Comments Шаблон:Webarchive by Grigory Pasko
- ↑ Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia – Past, Present, and Future. 1994. Шаблон:ISBN, page 95.
