Английская Википедия:Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago
Шаблон:Use mdy dates Шаблон:Primary sources Шаблон:Infobox SCOTUS case Шаблон:Wikisource Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), was a ruling that determined the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required states to provide just compensation for seizing private property.[1]
Background
Chicago City Council decided on October 9, 1880, to widen Rockwell Street, which required appropriating land owned by private individuals as well as a right of way owned by Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. In a jury trial, the jury awarded the individual land owners the fair value of their land but awarded the railroad company only $1.[2] The railroad company appealed.
The City of Chicago contended that due process of law was purely procedural and only required allowing the railroad company's case to be heard: "[T]he question as to the amount of compensation to be awarded to the railroad company was one of local law merely, and ... the company appearing and having full opportunity to be heard, the requirement of due process of law was observed."[3]
Majority opinion
Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Brewer was the sole dissenter, and Chief Justice Melville Fuller took no part.
"Regard must be had to substance, not to form"
Justice Harlan argued that the concept of due process of law required fair compensation to be given for any private property seized by the state. In responding to the City of Chicago's claim that due process of law was served merely by allowing the railroad company's grievance to be heard, Harlan stated that satisfying legislative procedure alone is not enough to satisfy due process: "In determining what is due process of law, regard must be had to substance, not to form."[4]
Harlan then claims that part of the 'substance' of due process requires the legislation to provide for fair compensation for private property: Шаблон:Blockquote
"Wanting in the due process of law required by the fourteenth amendment"
The court determined that just compensation was required for a conception of due process of law: Шаблон:Blockquote
Having decided that the state is required to give just compensation after seizing private property for public use, the majority then found that just compensation had in fact been given to the railroad company by the state.
Dissenting opinion
In his dissent, Justice Brewer agreed that the due process of law required just compensation but disagreed with the majority finding that just compensation had indeed been given to the railroad. He argued that the $1 in compensation given to the railroad was merely nominal. In response to the majority opinion, Brewer wrote: Шаблон:Blockquote
See also
- Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl
- List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 166
- Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
References
External links
- ↑ Шаблон:Ussc.
- ↑ 166 U.S. at 230.
- ↑ 166 U.S. at 233.
- ↑ 166 U.S. at 235.
- Английская Википедия
- United States Supreme Court cases
- United States Supreme Court cases of the Fuller Court
- Takings Clause case law
- 1897 in United States case law
- Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad
- Incorporation case law
- Transportation in Chicago
- 1897 in case law
- 1897 in rail transport
- Railway case law
- Страницы, где используется шаблон "Навигационная таблица/Телепорт"
- Страницы с телепортом
- Википедия
- Статья из Википедии
- Статья из Английской Википедии