Английская Википедия:China and weapons of mass destruction

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Шаблон:Short description Шаблон:Use American English Шаблон:Use mdy dates

Шаблон:Infobox nukes

Шаблон:Weapons of mass destruction

The People's Republic of China has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1967 at Lop Nur. Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did not ratify it.[1] China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984[2] and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997.[3]

The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal is a state secret.[4] There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and Federation of American Scientists estimated in 2024 that China has a stockpile of approximately 438 nuclear warheads,[4][5] while the United States Department of Defense put the estimate at more than 500 operational nuclear warheads,[6] making it the third-largest in the world.

In 2011, the Chinese government published a military white paper, which repeated its nuclear policies of maintaining a minimum deterrent with a no-first-use pledge. China has yet to define what it means by a "minimum deterrent posture". This is together with the fact that "it is deploying four new nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, invites concern as to the scale and intention of China’s nuclear upgrade".[7]

Nuclear weapons

History

Файл:Zhou Enlai announced the success of China's atomic bomb test.jpg
Zhou Enlai announces the success of China's atomic bomb test in 1964.
Файл:1966-10 1966年庆祝中国发射导弹核武器试验.jpg
A celebration of Chinese nuclear missile tests in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1966.

Mao Zedong reportedly referred to nuclear weapons as a paper tiger which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to scare and coerce.[8]Шаблон:Rp He favored China's development of nuclear weapons because "In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied by others, we should have atomic weapons by all means."[8]Шаблон:Rp

United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower's threats during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis to use nuclear weapons against military targets in Fujian province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program.[9]Шаблон:Rp While Mao did not expect to be able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, he believed that even a few bombs would increase China's diplomatic credibility. As a result of the Anti-Party Group incident in Soviet Union, Khrushchev's position within the international communist bloc became insecure for a time, thus necessitating the support of Chinese Communist Party and Mao Zedong. The CCP thus traded its support for Khrushchev for Soviet technology of nuclear weapons. The Agreement on New Technology for National Defence was later signed in October, which promised Soviet support for Chinese development of nuclear weapons.[10]

Construction of uranium-enrichment plants in Baotou and Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material productionШаблон:R and, in October 1957, agreed to provide a prototype bomb, missiles, and related technology. The Chinese, who preferred to import technology and components to developing them within China, exported uranium to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets sent two R-2 missiles in 1958.Шаблон:R

That year, however, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev told Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the United States and Britain. China was already opposed to Khrushchev's post-Stalin policy of "peaceful coexistence". Although Soviet officials assured China that it was under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened the emerging Sino-Soviet split. In June 1959, the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology cooperation,[11] and in July 1960, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program.[12]

According to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director William Foster, the American government, under Kennedy and Johnson administration, was concerned about the program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev was not interested. The Chinese conducted their first nuclear test, code-named 596, on 16 October 1964,[13]Шаблон:R China's last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996.[14] According to the Australian Geological Survey Organisation in Canberra, the yield of the 1996 test was 1-5 kilotons of TNT. This was China's 22nd underground test and 45th test overall.Шаблон:Citation needed In 2023, satellite open-source intelligence showed evidence of drilling shafts in Lop Nur where it could resume nuclear weapons testing.[15]

Файл:ChinaABomb 2.jpg
Satellite image of the testing site 4 days after China's first atomic bomb test

Size

Шаблон:As of, several non-official sources estimate that China has over 400 nuclear warheads.[4][5] In 2023, the United States Department of Defense estimated China possesses more than 500 operational nuclear warheads.[6]

Файл:Chinese nuclear bomb - A2923.jpg
A mock-up of China's first nuclear bomb.

The same year, United States Strategic Command indicated that China has equipped more nuclear warheads on its ICBMs than the United States (550 according to the New START treaty).[16]

Nuclear policy

China is one of the five nuclear weapons states (NWS) recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which China ratified in 1992. China's policy has traditionally been one of no first use while maintaining a deterrent retaliatory force targeted for countervalue targets.[17] According to a 2023 study by the National Defense University, China's nuclear doctrine has historically leaned toward maintaining a secure second-strike capability.[18]

China normally stores nuclear warheads separately from their launching systems, unless there is a heightened threat level.[19]

China, along with all other nuclear weapon states and all members of NATO with the exception of the Netherlands, decided not to sign the UN treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a binding agreement for negotiations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.[20]

China refused to join talks in 2020 between the U.S. and Russia on extending their bilateral New START nuclear arms reduction treaty, as the Trump administration requested. China's position is that as its nuclear warhead arsenal is a small fraction of the U.S. and Russia arsenals, their inclusion in an arms reduction treaty is unnecessary, and that it will join such talks when both U.S. and Russia has reduced their arsenal to near China's level.[21][22]

Nuclear proliferation

Файл:World nuclear weapons.png
Large stockpile with global range (dark blue), smaller stockpile with global range (medium blue).

Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program before China ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1992. In the early 1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan a "package" including uranium enrichment technology, high-enriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear weapon.[23] China also received stolen technology that Abdul Qadeer Khan brought back to Pakistan and Pakistan set up a centrifuge plant in China as revealed in his letters which state "(1)You know we had cooperation with China for 15 years. We put up a centrifuge plant at Hanzhong (250km south-west of Xi'an). We sent 135 C-130 plane loads of machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges. Our teams stayed there for weeks to help and their teams stayed here for weeks at a time. Late minister Liu We, V. M. [vice minister] Li Chew, Vice Minister Jiang Shengjie used to visit us. (2)The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50 kg enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%). Chinese helped PAEC [Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the rival organization to the Khan Research Laboratories] in setting up UF6 plant, production reactor for plutonium and reprocessing plant."[24]

Nuclear non-proliferation

Before the 1980s, China viewed arms control and nuclear non-proliferation regimes as mechanisms through which Western powers (particularly the U.S.) sought to restrain China.[25]Шаблон:Rp The Chinese government believed that the Treaty “[served] the interests of some States” and only favored the countries that already had nuclear weapons.[26] Additionally, the Chinese government thought this Treaty was discriminatory since many countries were attempting to restrict and deprive nuclear weapons of a country that had only just tested them successfully, rather than countries like the U.S. or U.S.S.R., which have at least 100 times more nuclear weapons.[27] Therefore, China chose not to join the NPT at that time.

Beginning in the 1980s, China's policy and attitude toward nuclear weapons and the NPT had changed under the administration of Deng Xiaoping.[26] Though China continued developing more advanced nuclear technology and weapons, by the 1980s, the country had indicated that it intended on accepting the terms of the NPT.[28]

China was active in the six-party talks in an effort to end North Korea's nuclear program in the early 2000s.[25]Шаблон:Rp The Six-Party talks ultimately failed,[25]Шаблон:Rp and in 2006, China voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear program.[25]Шаблон:Rp

The field of nuclear security has become a well-established area of successful U.S.-China cooperation.[29] In 2009, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Jintao called for a bolstered arms control agenda at the United Nations General Assembly, joining United States President Barack Obama's earlier calls for a nuclear-free world.[25]Шаблон:Rp Precipitated by a 2010 Nuclear Security Summit convened by the Obama administration, China and the U.S. launched a number of initiatives to secure potentially dangerous, Chinese-supplied, nuclear material in countries such as Ghana or Nigeria.[29] Through these initiatives, China and the U.S. have converted Chinese-origin Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSRs) from using highly enriched uranium to using low-enriched uranium fuel (which is not directly usable in weapons, thereby making reactors more proliferation resistant).[30]

Delivery systems estimates

Miniaturization

China has made significant improvements in its miniaturization techniques since the 1980s. There have been accusations, notably by the Cox Commission, that this was done primarily by covertly acquiring the U.S.'s W88 nuclear warhead design as well as guided ballistic missile technology.[31][32][33][34]

Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles

Шаблон:Main

Шаблон:Nuclear weapons The Dongfeng 5A is a single-warhead, three-stage, liquid-fueled missile with a range of 13,000+ km. In 2000, General Eugene Habiger of the U.S. Air Force, then-commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified before Congress that China has 18 silo-based DF-5s.[35] Since the early 21st century, the Second Artillery Corps have also deployed up to 10 Solid-fueled mobile DF-31 ICBMs, with a range of 7,200+ km and possibly up to 3 MIRVs.Шаблон:Cn China has also developed the DF-31A, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 11,200+ km with possibly 3–6 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability.Шаблон:Cn

China stores many of its missiles in huge tunnel complexes; US Representative Michael Turner[36] referring to 2009 Chinese media reports said "This network of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), and is used to transport nuclear weapons and forces."[37] A People's Liberation Army newspaper calls this tunnel system an underground Great Wall of China.[38]

Medium-range ballistic missiles

Approximately 55% of China's missiles are in the medium-range category, targeted at regional theater targets.[39]Шаблон:Rp

DF-3A/CSS-2

Шаблон:Main

DF-21/CSS-5

Шаблон:Main

Tactical cruise missiles

The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance in 2009 during a military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China as a part of the Second Artillery Corps' long-range conventional missile forces; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). A similar naval cruise missile, the YJ-62, was also revealed during the parade; the YJ-62 serves as the PLA Navy's latest development into naval rocketry.

Long-range ballistic missiles

The Chinese categorize long-range ballistic missiles as ones with a range between 3000 and 8000 km.[39]Шаблон:Rp

China "keeps most of its warheads at a central storage facility in the Qinling mountain range, though some are kept at smaller regional storage facilities."[40]

DF-4/CSS-3

Шаблон:Main

The Dong Feng 4 or DF-4 (also known as the CSS-3) is a long-range two-stage Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile with liquid fuel (nitric acid/UDMH). It was thought to be deployed in limited numbers in underground silos beginning in 1980.[39]Шаблон:Rp The DF-4 has a takeoff thrust of 1,224.00 kN, a takeoff weight of 82,000 kg, a diameter of 2.25 m, a length of 28.05 m, and a fin span of 2.74 m. It is equipped with a 2,190 kg nuclear warhead with 3,300 kt explosive yield, and its range is 5,500 km.[39]Шаблон:Rp The missile uses inertial guidance, resulting in a relatively poor CEP of 1,500 meters.Шаблон:Citation needed

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

DF-5A/CSS-4 Mod 2

Шаблон:Main

The Dongfeng 5 or DF-5 is a 3-stage Chinese ICBM. It has a length 32.6 m and a diameter of 3.35 m. It weighs 183 tonnes and has an estimated range of 12,000–15,000 kilometers.[39]Шаблон:Rp The DF-5 had its first flight in 1971 and was in operational service 10 years later. One of the downsides of the missile was that it took between 30 and 60 minutes to fuel.Шаблон:Citation needed

DF-31/CSS-10

Шаблон:Main

The Dong Feng 31 (or CSS-10) is a medium-range, three stage, solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile developed by the People's Republic of China. It is a land-based variant of the submarine-launched JL-2.

DF-41/CSS-X-10

Шаблон:Main

The DF-41 (or CSS-X-10) is an intercontinental ballistic missile believed to be operational. It is designed to carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), delivering multiple nuclear warheads.Шаблон:Cn

Nuclear cruise missiles

The US DoD estimated in 2006 that the PRC was developing ground- and air-launched cruise missiles that could easily be converted to carry nuclear warheads once developed.[41]

DH-10

Шаблон:Main

The DongHai 10 (DH-10) is a cruise missile developed in the People's Republic of China. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, the DH-10 is a second-generation land-attack cruise missile (LACM), with over 4,000 km range, integrated inertial navigation system, GPS, terrain contour mapping system, and digital scene-matching terminal-homing system. The missile is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) of 10 meters.

CJ-10

Шаблон:Main

The ChangJian-10 (Long Sword 10) is a cruise missile developed by China, based on the Hongniao missile family. It has a range of 2,200 km. Although not confirmed, it is suspected that the CJ-10 could carry nuclear warheads. An air-launched variant (named CJ-20) has also been developed.[42]

HongNiao missile family

Шаблон:Main

There are three missiles in this family: the HN-1, HN-2, and HN-3. Reportedly based on the Kh-SD/65 missiles, the Hongniao (or Red Bird) missiles are some of the first nuclear-capable cruise missiles in China. The HN-1 has a range of 600 km, the HN-2 has a range of 1,800 km, and the HN-3 has a range of 3,000 km.[43]

ChangFeng missile family

Шаблон:Main

There are 2 missiles in the Chang Feng (or Long Wind) family: CF-1 and CF-2. These are the first domestically developed long-range cruise missiles for China. The CF-1 has a range of 400 km while the CF-2 has a range of 800 km. Both variants can carry a 10 kt nuclear warhead.Шаблон:Cn

Sea-based weapons

Шаблон:Main

The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) stockpile of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is thought to be relatively new. China launched its first second-generation nuclear submarine in April 1981. The navy currently has a 1 Type 092 Xia class SSBN at roughly 8000 tons displacement. A second Type 092 was reportedly lost in an accident in 1985. The Type 092 is equipped with 12 JL-1 SLBMs with a range of 2150–2500 km. The JL-1 is a modified DF-21 missile. It is suspected that the Type 092 is being converted into a cruise missile submarine.

The Chinese navy has developed Type 094 ballistic missile submarine, open source satellite imagery has shown that at least 2 of these have been completed. This submarine will be capable of carrying 12 of the longer ranged, more modern JL-2s with a range of approximately 14000 km.Шаблон:Citation needed

China is also developing the Type 096 submarine, claimed to be able to carry up to 24 JL-3 ballistic missiles each. Some Chinese sources state that the submarine is already undergoing trials.[44]

Nuclear bomber force

Шаблон:Main

China's bomber force consists mostly of Chinese-made versions of Soviet aircraft. The People's Liberation Army Air Force has 120 H-6s (a variant of the Tupolev Tu-16). These bombers are outfitted to carry nuclear as well as conventional weapons. While the H-6 fleet is aging, it is not as old as the American B-52 Stratofortress.[39]Шаблон:Rp The Chinese have also produced the Xian JH-7 Flying Leopard fighter-bomber with a range and payload exceeding the F-111 (currently about 80 are in service) capable of delivering a nuclear strike. China has also bought the advanced Sukhoi Su-30 from Russia; currently, about 100 Su-30s (MKK and MK2 variants) have been purchased by China. The Su-30 is capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons.[39]Шаблон:Rp

China is alleged to be testing new H-8 and Xian H-20 strategic bombers which are either described as an upgraded H-6 or an aircraft in the same class as the US B-2, able to carry nuclear weapons.Шаблон:Cn

Fractional orbital bombardment system

In 2021, following tests by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, United States Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall III stated that China was developing and testing a fractional orbital bombardment system.[45][46]

Missile ranges

Biological weapons

Шаблон:Main Шаблон:See also

China is currently a signatory of the Biological Weapons Convention and Chinese officials have stated that China has never engaged in biological activities with offensive military applications. However, China was reported to have had an active biological weapons program in the 1980s.[47]

Kanatjan Alibekov, former director of one of the Soviet germ-warfare programs, said that China suffered a serious accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the late 1980s. Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance satellites identified a biological weapons laboratory and plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads. The Soviets suspected that two separate epidemics of hemorrhagic fever that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused by an accident in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing viral diseases.[48]

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed her concerns over possible Chinese biological weapon transfers to Iran and other nations in a letter to Senator Bob Bennett (R-Utah) in January 1997.[49] Albright stated that she had received reports regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to the Iranian government which concerned her and that the United States had to encourage China to adopt comprehensive export controls to prevent assistance to Iran's alleged biological weapons program. The United States acted upon the allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. In response to this, China issued export control protocols on dual use biological technology in late 2002.[50]

A biological program in China was described in a 2015 detailed study by the Indian Ministry of Defence funded Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. It pointed to 42 facilities, some in the same compound, that had the capacity, possibly latently, of research, development, production or testing of biological weapons.[51]

In 2017, a textbook published by the People's Liberation Army National Defence University called the Science of Military Strategy debuted the potential for biological warfare to include "specific ethnic genetic attacks."[52] The same year, former People's Liberation Army general Zhang Shibo authored a book that concluded that "modern biotechnology development is gradually showing strong signs characteristic of an offensive capability," including "specific ethnic genetic attacks" (特定种族基因攻击).[52]

According to Nuclear Threat Initiative, no evidence of the program's existence has been officially released.[53]

Chemical weapons

The People's Republic of China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on April 25, 1997.[3]

China was found to have supplied Albania with a stockpile of chemical weapons in the 1970s during the Cold War.[54]

See also

Шаблон:Library resources box

References

Шаблон:Reflist

Шаблон:Chinese Missiles Шаблон:People's Liberation Army Шаблон:Portal bar

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