Английская Википедия:Free and Open Indo-Pacific

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Шаблон:Short description

Файл:Indo-Pacific map outlines with ASEAN overlay.jpg
Indo-Pacific. The green circle covers ASEAN.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP; Шаблон:Lang-ja) is an umbrella term that encompasses Indo-Pacific-specific strategies of countries with similar interests in the region.[1] The concept, with its origins in Weimar German geopolitics, has been revived since 2006 through Japanese initiatives and American cooperation.[2][3]

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan introduced the FOIP concept and formally put it down as a strategy in 2016.[4][1] In 2019 the United States Department of State published a document formalizing its concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific.[5] Since then, multiple countries in regions from the European Union to Southeast Asia, have referred to the Indo-Pacific in national security or foreign policy documents.

Origin

Historians and political scientists have shown that the "Indo-Pacific" emerged in the context of Weimar German geopolitics in the 1920s-1930s, and since then spread to Japan through Karl Haushofer's intervention.[6][7][8]

During 2006–07 when Taro Aso was Foreign Minister, the Japanese government presented the idea of "Freedom and Prosperity".[9]

In August 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's speech in the Parliament of India included the following:[10] Шаблон:Blockquote

It was the base model of FOIP according to Keiichi Ichikawa, the diplomat who had been in charge of Abe's Policy Coordination Division,[11] and Шаблон:Ill, one of the consulted experts.[3]

According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Abe first officially explained Japan's commitment to the FOIP strategy in Kenya on 27 August 2016.[3][12]

However, even before then, the concept of FOIP also fell in place with Abe's thinking of "diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map". In 2012, Abe's first elucidation of FOIP went as follows:[3][13] Шаблон:Blockquote

Indo-Pacific-specific strategies

Japan's diplomatic implementation

Файл:Shinzo Abe (2017).jpg
Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan (2012-2020).

In January 2013, the Japanese government had prepared a PM Abe's speech on "Five New Principles" to be delivered in Jakarta. However, as PM Abe had to go back to Japan before the scheduled date to respond to In Amenas hostage crisis, the speech was not realized; instead its script was made available.[14]

In 2015, to implement the framework, Japan upgraded "The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" with US,[15] agreed and shared "Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership" with India,[16] agreed and shared "Next steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond" with Australia,[17] and the quadrilateral framework was prepared.

In November 2017, President of the United States Donald Trump visited Japan, and summit meeting was held with PM Abe. Regarding regional and global affairs, the two leaders discussed on "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy", and affirmed that Japan and the United States will work together to promote peace and prosperity in the region by developing the Indo-Pacific as free and open and directed relevant ministers and institutions to flesh out detailed cooperation, in particular, in the following areas:[18]

  • Promotion and establishment of fundamental values (rule of law, freedom of navigation, etc.)
  • Pursuit of economic prosperity (improvement of connectivity, etc.)
  • Commitment for peace and stability (capacity building on maritime law enforcement, etc.)

On 10 February 2023, PM Fumio Kishida oversaw the signing of several defense pacts and investment deals with President Bongbong Marcos of the Philippines; Marcos also announced he was considering opening tripartite defense talks with the United States and Japan.[19][20]

On 20 March 2023, Kishida, who visited New Delhi, India, delivered a policy speech entitled "the Future of the Indo-Pacific—Japan's New Plan for a `Free and Open Indo-Pacific'– `Together with India, as an Indispensable Partner'" at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), announcing Japan's new plan for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)". S. Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister of India, attended the speech, representing the Indian government.[21]

Шаблон:As of, Japan is boosting Pacific Island Country resilience through increased collaboration under this vision.[22][23]

India's foreign policy

In June 2018, PM Narendra Modi articulated India's vision towards the "Indo-Pacific region" for the first time.[24] A central feature of Indian PM Modi's foreign policy has been to advance the need to create a "free, open, and inclusive" Indo-Pacific.[25]

According to defense minister Rajnath Singh, the Indian government stands for a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific as it is important for economic development of the region and the wider global community.[26]

U.S. National Security Strategy

On 18 October 2017, The United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson delivered remarks speech at CSIS, explicitly using the term "free and open Indo-Pacific".[27] And in the 2017 US National Security Strategy, Asia-Pacific was exchanged with Indo-Pacific.[3]

On 30 May 2018, The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is also renamed the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).[28]

In December 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken delivered a speech on the United States' approach to the Indo-Pacific in Jakarta.[29][30]

In February 2022, the Biden-⁠Harris Administration published the "Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States" which describes "free and open" as a top priority.[31] In its 2022 National Security Strategy, "Promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific" is the topic at the top of its fourth part.[32]

Australia's foreign policy

In the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, a stable and prosperous Indo–Pacific is described as the most important Australia's interest, and Indo–Pacific democracies are described as of first order importance to Australia.[33]

New Zealand's strategic direction

In October 2021, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) published the MFAT Strategic Intentions 2021-2025 which describes "seven strategic goals". For the Indo-Pacific, the MFAT's goal is: Шаблон:Blockquote "Free and Open Indo-Pacific constructs", "free and open trade" and "free and open regional development" are also described in the document.[34]

Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy

In November 2022, Canada launched the Indo-Pacific Strategy to support long-term growth, prosperity, and security for Canadians.[35][36]

The United Kingdom's strategic framework

After Brexit in 2020, the UK Government expressed its wish to participate in promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific, reflected in its Integrated Review Refresh 2023.[37][38]

ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)

In June 2019 at the 34th ASEAN Summit, they released ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which is consistent with and anchored in the principles of ASEAN centrality through ASEANjournal-led mechanisms like the East Asia Summit (EAS).[39] The AOIP was of Indonesia's proposal, and the document calls for dialogue, co-operation, inclusivity, and a rule-based framework, rather than rivalry.[40] While accepting FOIP's basic idea that an ASEAN-led AOIP is "free and open," AOIP also considers "inclusiveness," which does not uniformly exclude China, and it is appropriate to understand that the "centrality of ASEAN" was emphasized as a device for that purpose.[41]

Indonesia's Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept

In May 2013, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa made a speech on "An Indonesian perspective on the Indo-Pacific" at The Indonesia Conference hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as keynote address.[42][43]

At the CSIS Global Dialogue in May 2018 in Jakarta, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi unveiled the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept. The concept is based on the principles of being "open, transparent and inclusive, promoting the habit of dialogue, promoting cooperation and friendship, and upholding international law".[44] And in August 2018, Retno formally presented the Indonesian Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept to the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the East Asia Summit (EAS).[45]

In November 2018, president Joko Widodo said that "The Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept puts emphasis on several principles, including cooperation, instead of rivalry, inclusiveness, transparency and openness as well as respect for international law", at the 13th EAS plenary session held at the Suntec Singapore Convention and Exhibition Centre.[46]

The Philippines' diplomatic strategy

While it has yet to produce a definitive Indo-Pacific strategy document Шаблон:As of, the administration of Bongbong Marcos has discussed intensifying cooperation with the U.S. government, whose officials have made agreements with the Philippines on energy, telecommunications, human rights, education, food security, and nuclear technology sales.[47] In February 2023, Marcos briefly met with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to finalize an agreement to add U.S.-accessible Philippine military bases to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement allowing U.S. military visits.[48] The Philippines also signed a defense agreement with Japan earlier that year, and Marcos announced that talks for a joint defense pact between Japan, the Philippines, and the United States are underway. The Philippines is also a prolific buyer of South Korean arms and military equipment,[49] and has a long-standing security partnership with Australia and India.[50][51]

Bangladesh's Indo-Pacific outlook

In April 2023, the foreign ministry of Bangladesh formally announced its Indo-Pacific Outlook with 15 points which emphasized a "peaceful, secure and inclusive" Indo-Pacific.[52] The Bangladeshi strategy promotes resilience in global value chains; food, water and energy security; freedom of navigation and overflight; maritime security and counter-terrorism; combating crime networks; nonproliferation, peacekeeping, sustainable development, SDG 14, and the "unimpeded and free flow of commerce in the Indo-Pacific".[52][53][54]

South Korea's diplomatic strategy

Шаблон:Main Article South Korea's approach to the Indo-Pacific is based on cooperation and complementarity between its New Southern Policy and the U.S.'s and the Quad's Indo-Pacific policy, but without openly antagonizing China.[55] In this respect, South Korea is balancing the desire for foreign policy autonomy with the need for strategic alliances, above all with the United States.[56]

In December 2022, South Korea published its "Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region".[57]

NATO

Шаблон:As of, NATO does not have a policy for the Indo-Pacific, yet its political and diplomatic interests in the region are broad. Apart from the U.S., more recently other NATO countries have reoriented their maritime policy in defense of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).[58]

Countries in the European Union

Файл:French republic+EEZ without Antarctica-en.svg
France's territories and EEZ, excluding Antarctic territories. A large proportion of France's overseas territories are located in the Indo-Pacific region.

In September 2021, the European Union published its Joint Communication on the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy.[59]

France

France is an Indo-Pacific power because of the several territories of France located there. The administration of Emmanuel Macron released a strategy in 2019 which was subsequently updated in 2021.[60]

Germany
Germany adopted policy guidelines for the region in September 2020.[61]

Netherlands
In November 2020, the Netherlands published the white paper "Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia". [62]

Criticism

Шаблон:Expand section Political scientist Sharifah Munirah Alatas has argued that the origin of the term "Indo-Pacific" was Euro-centric, so it lacked the input of Asian countries in a broader anticolonial context.[8] The Australian Citizens Party has publicly denounced the "Nazi roots" of the "Indo-Pacific" concept.[63]

Chinese officials often criticize the "Indo-Pacific" concept and see it as a tool to contain China.[64] China's partner, Russia, also echoes Chinese views,[65] describing it as a "closed and exclusive group structure", and called for an "equal, open, and inclusive Asia-Pacific security system that does not target third countries".

See also

References

Шаблон:Reflist

Further reading

External links

Шаблон:Authority control

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