Английская Википедия:Hafez al-Assad
Шаблон:Short description Шаблон:Use dmy dates Шаблон:For Шаблон:Infobox officeholder Hafez al-AssadШаблон:Efn (6 October 1930Шаблон:Snd10 June 2000) was a Syrian statesman, military officer and revolutionary who served as the 18th president of Syria from 1971 until his death in 2000. He had previously served as prime minister of Syria from 1970 to 1971 as well as regional secretary of the regional command of the Syrian regional branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party and secretary general of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party from 1970 to 2000. Hafez al-Assad was a key participant in the 1963 Syrian coup d'état, which brought the Syrian regional branch of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party to power in the country.
The new leadership appointed Hafez as the commander of the Syrian Air Force. In February 1966 Hafez participated in a second coup, which toppled the traditional leaders of the Ba'ath Party. Hafez was appointed defence minister by the new government. Four years later Hafez initiated a third coup, which ousted the de facto leader Salah Jadid, and appointed himself as leader of Syria. Hafez imposed various changes to the Ba'athist government when he took power. He subordinated state socialism for a mixed economic model and defended private property. Hafez also abandoned the rhetoric of exporting "socialist revolution" by strengthening Syria's foreign relations with countries that his predecessor had deemed reactionary. Hafez sided with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War in return for support against Israel and, whilst he had forsaken the pan-Arab concept of unifying the Arab world into one Arab nation, he sought to paint Syria as the defender of the Palestinians against Israel.
When he came to power Hafez organised the state along sectarian lines. (Sunnis and non-Alawites became figure-heads of political institutions whilst the Alawites took control of the military, intelligence, bureaucracy and security apparatuses.) Ba'athist decision-making authority that had previously been collegial was reduced and given to the Syrian president. The Syrian government ceased to be a one-party system in the normal sense of the word and was turned into a one-party dictatorship with a strong presidency. To maintain this system, a cult of personality centred on Hafez and his family was created by the president and the Ba'ath party. The Assad family’s personality cult was integrated with the Ba’athist doctrine to shape the state's official ideology. Hafez ordered an intervention in Lebanon in 1976, which resulted in the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. During his rule Hafez crushed an Islamist uprising led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood rebels through a series of crackdowns culminating in the Hama massacre.
After consolidating his personal authority over the Syrian government Hafez began looking for a successor. His first choice was his brother Rifaat, but Rifaat attempted to seize power in 1983–1984 when Hafez's health was in doubt. Rifaat was subsequently exiled when Hafez's health recovered. Hafez's next choice of successor was his eldest son, Basil. However Basil died in a car accident in 1994 and Hafez turned to his third choice—his younger son Bashar, who at that time had no political experience. The move to appoint a member of his own family as his successor was met with criticism in some quarters of the Syrian ruling class, but Hafez persisted with his plan and demoted officials who opposed this succession. Hafez died in 2000 and Bashar succeeded him as president. Under his rule the country would later collapse into civil war. Шаблон:Hafez al-Assad series
Early life
Family
Hafez was born on 6 October 1930 in Qardaha to an Alawite family of the Kalbiyya tribe.Шаблон:SfnШаблон:SfnШаблон:Sfn His paternal grandfather, Sulayman al-Wahhish, gained the nickname al-Wahhish (wild beast) for his strength.Шаблон:Sfn Hafez al-Assad's parents were Na'sa Shalish and Ali al-Assad.Шаблон:Sfn His father married twice and had eleven children.Шаблон:Sfn Hafez was his ninth son and the fourth from his second marriage.Шаблон:Sfn By the 1920s Ali was respected locally and initially opposed to the French Mandate for Syria established in 1923.Шаблон:Sfn Nevertheless Ali Sulayman later cooperated with the French administration and was appointedШаблон:By whom to an official post.Шаблон:Sfn Local residents called him "al-Assad" (the lion) for his accomplishmentsШаблон:Sfn and in 1927 he made the nickname his surname.Шаблон:Sfn In 1936 he was one of 80 Alawite notables who signed a letter addressed to the French prime minister stating that "[the] Alawi people rejected attachment to Syria and wished to stay under French protection".Шаблон:Sfn
Education and early political career
Alawites initially opposed a united Syrian state (since they thought their status as a religious minority would endanger them),Шаблон:Sfn and Hafez's father shared this belief.Шаблон:Sfn After the French left Syria in 1946, many Syrians mistrusted the Alawites because of their alignment with France.Шаблон:Sfn Hafez left his Alawite village, beginning his education at age nine in Sunni-dominatedШаблон:Sfn Latakia.Шаблон:Sfn He became the first in his family to attend high school,Шаблон:Sfn but in Latakia, Hafez faced anti-Alawite bias from Sunnis.Шаблон:Sfn He was an excellent student, winning several prizes at about age 14.Шаблон:Sfn Hafez lived in a poor, predominantly Alawite part of Latakia;Шаблон:Sfn to fit in, he approached political parties that welcomed Alawites.Шаблон:Sfn These parties (which also espoused secularism) were the Syrian Communist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Arab Ba'ath Party; Hafez joined the Ba'ath in 1946;Шаблон:Sfn some of his friends belonged to the SSNP.Шаблон:Sfn The Ba'ath (Renaissance) Party espoused a pan-Arabist, socialist ideology.Шаблон:Sfn
Hafez proved an asset to the party, organizing Ba'ath student cells and carrying the party's message to the poor sections of Latakia and to Alawite villages.Шаблон:Sfn He was opposed by the Muslim Brotherhood, which allied itself with wealthy and conservative Muslim families.Шаблон:Sfn Hafez's high school accommodated students from rich and poor families,Шаблон:Sfn and Hafez was joined by poor, anti-establishment Sunni Muslim youth from the Ba'ath Party in confrontations with students from wealthy Brotherhood families.Шаблон:Sfn He made many Sunni friends, some of whom later became his political allies.Шаблон:Sfn While still a teenager, Hafez became increasingly prominent in the partyШаблон:Sfn as an organizer and recruiter, head of his school's student-affairs committee from 1949 to 1951 and president of the Union of Syrian Students.Шаблон:Sfn During his political activism in school, he met many men who would later serve him when he became president.Шаблон:Sfn
Air Force career: 1950–1958
After graduating from high school, Hafez aspired to be a medical doctor, but his father could not pay for his study at the Jesuit Saint Joseph University in Beirut.Шаблон:Sfn Instead, in 1950, he decided to join the Syrian Armed Forces.Шаблон:Sfn Hafez entered the Homs Military Academy, which offered free food, lodging and a stipend.Шаблон:Sfn He wanted to fly, and entered the flying school in Aleppo in 1950.Шаблон:SfnШаблон:Sfn Hafez graduated in 1955, after which he was commissioned a lieutenant in the Syrian Air Force.Шаблон:Sfn Upon graduation from flying school, he won a best-aviator trophy,Шаблон:SfnШаблон:Sfn and shortly afterwards was assigned to the Mezze air base near Damascus.Шаблон:Sfn He married Anisa Makhlouf in 1957, a distant relative of the powerful Makhlouf family.Шаблон:Sfn
In 1955, the military split in a revolt against President Adib Shishakli.Шаблон:Sfn Hashim al-Atassi, head of the National Bloc and briefly president after Sami al-Hinnawi's coup, returned as president and Syria was again under civilian rule.Шаблон:Sfn After 1955, Atassi's hold on the country was increasingly shaky.Шаблон:Sfn As a result of the 1955 election, Atassi was replaced by Shukri al-Quwatli, who was president before Syria's independence from France.Шаблон:Sfn The Ba'ath Party grew closer to the Communist Party not because of shared ideology, but a shared opposition to the West.Шаблон:Sfn At the academy, Hafez met Mustafa Tlass, his future minister of Defence.Шаблон:Sfn In 1955, Hafez was sent to Egypt for a further six months of training.Шаблон:Sfn When Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in 1956, Syria feared retaliation from the United Kingdom, and Assad flew in an air-defense mission.Шаблон:Sfn He was among the Syrian pilots who flew to Cairo to show Syria's commitment to Egypt.Шаблон:Sfn After finishing a course in Egypt the following year, Assad returned to a small airbase near Damascus.Шаблон:Sfn During the Suez Crisis, he also flew a reconnaissance mission over northern and eastern Syria.Шаблон:Sfn In 1957, as squadron commander, Assad was sent to the Soviet Union for training in flying MiG-17s.Шаблон:Sfn He spent ten months in the Soviet Union, during which he fathered a daughter (who died as an infant while he was abroad) with his wife.Шаблон:Sfn
In 1958, Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic (UAR), separating themselves from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey (who were aligned with the United Kingdom).Шаблон:Sfn This pact led to the rejection of Communist influence in favour of Egyptian control over Syria.Шаблон:Sfn All Syrian political parties (including the Ba'ath Party) were dissolved, and senior officers—especially those who supported the Communists—were dismissed from the Syrian armed forces.Шаблон:Sfn Assad, however, remained in the army and rose quickly through the ranks.Шаблон:Sfn After reaching the rank of captain, he was transferred to Egypt, continuing his military education with the future president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak.Шаблон:Sfn
Шаблон:AnchorRunup to 1963 coup: 1958–1963
Шаблон:Main Hafez was not content with a professional military career, regarding it as a gateway to politics.Шаблон:Sfn After the creation of the UAR, Ba'ath Party leader Michel Aflaq was forced by Nasser to dissolve the party.Шаблон:Sfn During the UAR's existence, the Ba'ath Party experienced a crisisШаблон:Sfn for which several of its members—mostly young—blamed Aflaq.Шаблон:Sfn To resurrect the Syrian Regional Branch of the party, Muhammad Umran, Salah Jadid, Hafez and others established the Military Committee.Шаблон:Sfn In 1957–58 Hafez rose to a dominant position in the Military Committee, which mitigated his transfer to Egypt.Шаблон:Sfn After Syria left the UAR in September 1961, Assad and other Ba'athist officers were removed from the military by the new government in Damascus, and he was given a minor clerical position at the Ministry of Transport.Шаблон:Sfn
Assad played a minor role in the failed 1962 military coup, for which he was jailed in Lebanon and later repatriated.Шаблон:Sfn That year, Aflaq convened the 5th National Congress of the Ba'ath Party (where he was re-elected as the Secretary-General of the National Command) and ordered the re-establishment of the party's Syrian Regional Branch.Шаблон:Sfn At the Congress, the Military Committee (through Umran) established contacts with Aflaq and the civilian leadership.Шаблон:Sfn The committee requested permission to seize power by force, and Aflaq agreed to the conspiracy.Шаблон:Sfn After the success of the Iraqi coup d'état led by the Ba'ath Party's Iraqi Regional Branch, the Military Committee hastily convened to launch a Ba'athist military coup in March 1963 against President Nazim al-KudsiШаблон:Sfn (which Hafez helped plan).Шаблон:SfnШаблон:Sfn The coup was scheduled for 7 March, but he announced a postponement (until the next day) to the other units.Шаблон:Sfn During the coup Hafez led a small group to capture the Dumayr airbase, Шаблон:Convert northeast of Damascus.Шаблон:Sfn His group was the only one that encountered resistance.Шаблон:Sfn Some planes at the base were ordered to bomb the conspirators, and because of this Hafez hurried to reach the base before dawn.Шаблон:Sfn Because the 70th Armored Brigade's surrender took longer than anticipated, however, he arrived in broad daylight.Шаблон:Sfn When Hafez threatened the base commander with shelling, the commander negotiated a surrender;Шаблон:Sfn Hafez later claimed that the base could have withstood his forces.Шаблон:Sfn
Early Ba'ath Party rule: 1963–1970
Aflaqite leadership: 1963–1966
Military work
Not long after Hafiz's election to the Regional Command, the Military Committee ordered him to strengthen the committee's position in the military establishment.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz may have received the most important job of all, since his primary goal was to end factionalism in the Syrian military and make it a Ba'ath monopoly;Шаблон:Sfn as he said, he had to create an "ideological army".Шаблон:Sfn To help with this task, Hafiz recruited Zaki al-Arsuzi, who indirectly (through Wahib al-Ghanim) inspired him to join the Ba'ath Party when he was young.Шаблон:Sfn Arsuzi accompanied Hafiz on tours of military camps, where Arsuzi lectured the soldiers on Ba'athist thought.Шаблон:Sfn In gratitude for his work, Hafiz gave Arsuzi a government pension.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz continued his Ba'athification of the military by appointing loyal officers to key positions and ensuring that the "political education of the troops was not neglected".Шаблон:Sfn He demonstrated his skill as a patient planner during this period.Шаблон:Sfn As Patrick Seale wrote, Hafiz's mastery of detail "suggested the mind of an intelligence officer".Шаблон:Sfn
Hafiz was in charge of the Syrian Air Force.Шаблон:Sfn By the end of 1964 he was named commander of the Air Force, with the rank of major general.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz gave privileges to Air Force officers, appointed his confidants to senior and sensitive positions and established an efficient intelligence network.Шаблон:Sfn Air Force Intelligence, under the command of Muhammad al-Khuli, became independent of Syria's other intelligence organizations and received assignments beyond Air Force jurisdiction.Шаблон:Sfn Assad prepared himself for an active role in the power struggles that lay ahead.Шаблон:Sfn
Шаблон:AnchorPower struggle and 1966 coup
Шаблон:Main In the aftermath of the 1963 coup, at the First Regional Congress (held 5 September 1963) Hafiz was elected to the Syrian Regional Command (the highest decision-making body in the Syrian Regional Branch).Шаблон:Sfn While not a leadership role, it was Hafiz's first appearance in national politics;Шаблон:Sfn in retrospect, he said he positioned himself "on the left" in the Regional Command.Шаблон:Sfn Khalid al-Falhum, a Palestinian who would later work for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), met Hafiz in 1963; he noted that Hafiz was a strong leftist "but was clearly not a communist", committed instead to Arab nationalism.Шаблон:Sfn
During the 1964 Hama riot, Hafiz voted to suppress the uprising violently if needed.Шаблон:Sfn The decision to suppress the Hama riot led to a schism in the Military Committee between Umran and Jadid.Шаблон:Sfn Umran opposed force, instead wanting the Ba'ath Party to create a coalition with other pan-Arab forces.Шаблон:Sfn Jadid desired a strong one-party state, similar to those in the communist countries of Europe.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz, as a junior partner, kept quiet at first but eventually allied himself with Jadid.Шаблон:Sfn Why Hafiz chose to side with him has been widely discussed; he probably shared Jadid's radical ideological outlook.Шаблон:Sfn Having lost his footing on the Military Committee, Umran aligned himself with Aflaq and the National Command; he told them that the Military Committee was planning to seize power in the party by ousting them.Шаблон:Sfn Because of Umran's defection, Rifaat al-Assad (Hafiz's brother) succeeded Umran as commander of a secret military force tasked with protecting Military Committee loyalists.Шаблон:Sfn
In its bid to seize power the Military Committee allied themselves with the regionalists, a group of cells in the Syrian Regional Branch that refused to disband in 1958 when ordered to do so.Шаблон:Sfn Although Aflaq considered these cells traitors, Hafiz called them the "true cells of the party"; this again highlighted differences between the Military Committee and the National Command headed by Aflaq.Шаблон:Sfn At the Eighth National Congress in 1965 Hafiz was elected to the National Command, the party's highest decision-making body.Шаблон:Sfn From his position as part of the National Command, Hafiz informed Jadid on its activities.Шаблон:Sfn After the congress, the National Command dissolved the Syrian Regional Command; Aflaq proposed Salah al-Din al-Bitar as prime minister, but Hafiz and Brahim Makhous opposed Bitar's nomination.Шаблон:Sfn According to Seale, Hafiz abhorred Aflaq; he considered him an autocrat and a rightist, accusing him of "ditching" the party by ordering the dissolution of the Syrian Regional Branch in 1958.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz, who also disliked Aflaq's supporters, nevertheless opposed a show of force against the Aflaqites.Шаблон:Sfn In response to the imminent coup Hafiz, Naji Jamil, Husayn Mulhim and Yusuf Sayigh left for London.Шаблон:Sfn
In the 1966 Syrian coup d'état, the Military Committee overthrew the National Command.Шаблон:Sfn The coup led to a permanent schism in the Ba'ath movement, the advent of neo-Ba'athism and the establishment of two centers of the international Ba'athist movement: one Iraqi- and the other Syrian-dominated.Шаблон:Sfn
Шаблон:AnchorJadid as strongman: 1966–1970
Шаблон:AnchorBeginning
After the coup, Hafiz was appointed Minister of Defense.Шаблон:Sfn This was his first cabinet post, and through his position, he would be thrust into the forefront of the Syrian–Israeli conflict.Шаблон:Sfn His government was radically socialist, and sought to remake society from top to bottom.Шаблон:Sfn Although Hafiz was a radical, he opposed the headlong rush for change.Шаблон:Sfn Despite his title, he had little power in the government and took more orders than he issued.Шаблон:Sfn Jadid was the undisputed leader at the time, opting to remain in the office of Assistant Regional Secretary of the Syrian Regional Command instead of taking executive office (which had historically been held by Sunnis).Шаблон:Sfn Nureddin al-Atassi was given three of the four top executive positions in the country: President, Secretary-General of the National Command and Regional Secretary of the Syrian Regional Command.Шаблон:Sfn The post of prime minister was given to Yusuf Zu'ayyin.Шаблон:Sfn Jadid (who was establishing his authority) focused on civilian issues and gave Hafiz de facto control of the Syrian military, considering him no threat.Шаблон:Sfn
During the failed coup d'état of late 1966, Salim Hatum tried to overthrow Jadid's government.Шаблон:Sfn Hatum (who felt snubbed when he was not appointed to the Regional Command after the February 1966 coup d'état) sought revenge and the return to power of Hammud al-Shufi, the first Regional Secretary of the Regional Command after the Syrian Regional Branch's re-establishment in 1963.Шаблон:Sfn When Jadid, Atassi and Regional Command member Jamil Shayya visited Suwayda, forces loyal to Hatum surrounded the city and captured them.Шаблон:Sfn In a twist of fate, the city's Druze elders forbade the murder of their guests and demanded that Hatum wait.Шаблон:Sfn Jadid and the others were placed under house arrest, with Hatum planning to kill them at his first opportunity.Шаблон:Sfn When word of the mutiny spread to the Ministry of Defense, Hafiz ordered the 70th Armored Brigade to the city.Шаблон:Sfn By this time Hatum, a Druze, knew that Hafiz would order the bombardment of Suwayda (a Druze-dominated city) if Hatum did not accede to his demands.Шаблон:Sfn Hatum and his supporters fled to Jordan, where they were given asylum.Шаблон:Sfn How Hafiz learned about the conspiracy is unknown, but Mustafa al-Hajj Ali (head of military intelligence) may have telephoned the Ministry of Defense.Шаблон:Sfn Due to his prompt action, Hafiz earned Jadid's gratitude.Шаблон:Sfn
In the aftermath of the attempted coup Hafiz and Jadid purged the party's military organization, removing 89 officers; Hafiz removed an estimated 400 officers, Syria's largest military purge to date.Шаблон:Sfn The purges, which began when the Ba'ath Party took power in 1963, had left the military weak.Шаблон:Sfn As a result, when the Six-Day War broke out, Syria had no chance of victory.Шаблон:Sfn
Seizing power
The Arab defeat in the Six-Day War, in which Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria, provoked a furious quarrel among Syria's leadership.Шаблон:Sfn The civilian leadership blamed military incompetence, and the military responded by criticizing the civilian leadership (led by Jadid).Шаблон:Sfn Several high-ranking party members demanded Hafiz's resignation, and an attempt was made to vote him out of the Regional Command, the party's highest decision-making body.Шаблон:Sfn The motion was defeated by one vote, with Abd al-Karim al-Jundi (who the anti-Hafiz members hoped would succeed Hafiz as defense minister) voting, as Patrick Seale put it, "in a comradely gesture" to retain him.Шаблон:Sfn During the end of the war, the party leadership freed Aflaqites Umran, Amin al-Hafiz and Mansur al-Atrash from prison.Шаблон:Sfn Shortly after his release, Hafiz was approached by dissident Syrian military officers to oust the government; he refused, believing that a coup at that time would have helped Israel, but not Syria.Шаблон:Sfn
The war was a turning point for Hafiz (and Ba'athist Syria in general),Шаблон:Sfn and his attempted ouster began a power struggle with Jadid for control of the country.Шаблон:Sfn Until then Hafiz had not shown ambition for high office, arousing little suspicion in others.Шаблон:Sfn From the 1963 Syrian coup d'état to the Six-Day War in 1967, Hafiz did not play a leading role in politics and was usually overshadowed by his contemporaries.Шаблон:Sfn As Patrick Seale wrote, he was "apparently content to be a solid member of the team without the aspiration to become number one".Шаблон:Sfn Although Jadid was slow to see Hafiz's threat, shortly after the war Hafiz began developing a network in the military and promoted friends and close relatives to high positions.Шаблон:Sfn
Differences with Jadid
Hafiz believed that Syria's defeat in the Six-Day War was Jadid's fault, and the accusations against himself were unjust.Шаблон:Sfn By this time Jadid had total control of the Regional Command, whose members supported his policies.Шаблон:Sfn Assad and Jadid began to differ on policy;Шаблон:Sfn Assad believed that Jadid's policy of a people's war (an armed-guerrilla strategy) and class struggle had failed Syria, undermining its position.Шаблон:Sfn Although Jadid continued to champion the concept of a people's war even after the Six-Day War, Hafiz opposed it. He felt that the Palestinian guerrilla fighters had been given too much autonomy and had raided Israel constantly, which in turn sparked the war.Шаблон:Sfn Jadid had broken diplomatic relations with countries he deemed reactionary, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.Шаблон:Sfn Because of this, Syria did not receive aid from other Arab countries. Egypt and Jordan, which participated in the war, received £135 million per year for an undisclosed period.Шаблон:Sfn
While Jadid and his supporters prioritised socialism and the "internal revolution", Hafiz wanted the leadership to focus on foreign policy and the containment of Israel.Шаблон:Sfn The Ba'ath Party was divided over several issues, such as how the government could best use Syria's limited resources, the ideal relationship between the party and the people, the organization of the party and whether the class struggle should end.Шаблон:Sfn These subjects were discussed heatedly in Ba'ath Party conclaves, and when they reached the Fourth Regional Congress the two sides were irreconcilable.Шаблон:Sfn
Hafiz wanted to "democratize" the party by making it easier for people to join.Шаблон:Sfn Jadid was wary of too large a membership, believing that the majority of those who joined were opportunists.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz, in an interview with Patrick Seale in the 1980s, stated that such a policy would make Party members believe they were a privileged class.Шаблон:Sfn Another problem, Hafiz believed, was the lack of local-government institutions.Шаблон:Sfn Under Jadid, there was no governmental level below the Council of Ministers (the Syrian government).Шаблон:Sfn When the Ba'athist Iraqi Regional Branch (which continued to support the Aflaqite leadership) took control of Iraq in the 17 July Revolution, Hafiz was one of the few high-level politicians wishing to reconcile with them;Шаблон:Sfn he called for the establishment of an "Eastern Front" with Iraq against Israel in 1968.Шаблон:Sfn Jadid's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was also criticised by Hafiz, who believed it had failed.Шаблон:Sfn In many ways the relationship between the countries was poor, with the Soviets refusing to acknowledge Jadid's scientific socialism and Soviet newspapers calling him a "hothead".Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz, on the contrary, called for greater pragmatism in decision-making.Шаблон:Sfn
"Duality of power"
The conflict between Hafiz and Jadid became the talk of the army and the party, with a "duality of power" noted between them.Шаблон:Sfn Shortly after the failed attempt to expel Hafiz from the Regional Command, he began to consolidate his position in the military establishmentШаблон:Sfn—for example, by replacing Chief of Staff Ahmad al-Suwaydani with his friend Mustafa Tlass.Шаблон:Sfn Although Suwaydani's relationship with Jadid had deteriorated, he was removed because of his complaints about "Alawi influence in the army".Шаблон:Sfn Tlass was later appointed Hafiz's Deputy Minister of Defense (his second-in-command).Шаблон:Sfn Others removed from their positions were Ahmad al-Mir (a founder and former member of the Military Committee, and former commander of the Golan Front) and Izzat Jadid (a close supporter of Jadid and commander of the 70th Armoured Brigade).Шаблон:Sfn
By the Fourth Regional Congress and Tenth National Congress in September and October 1968, Hafiz had extended his grip on the army, and Jadid still controlled the party.Шаблон:Sfn At both congresses, Hafiz was outvoted on most issues, and his arguments were firmly rejected.Шаблон:Sfn While he failed in most of his attempts, he had enough support to remove two socialist theoreticians (Prime Minister Yusuf Zu'ayyin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Brahim Makhous) from the Regional Command.Шаблон:Sfn However, the military's involvement in party politics was unpopular with the rank and file; as the gulf between Hafiz and Jadid widened, the civilian and military party bodies were forbidden to contact each other.Шаблон:Sfn Despite this, Hafiz was winning the race to accumulate power.Шаблон:Sfn As Munif al-Razzaz (ousted in the 1966 Syrian coup d'état) noted, "Jadid's fatal mistake was to attempt to govern the army through the party".Шаблон:Sfn
While Hafiz had taken control of the armed forces through his position as Minister of Defense, Jadid still controlled the security and intelligence sectors through Abd al-Karim al-Jundi (head of the National Security Bureau).Шаблон:Sfn Jundi—a paranoid, cruel man—was feared throughout Syria.Шаблон:Sfn In February 1969, the Hafiz-Jadid conflict erupted in violent clashes through their respective proteges: Rifaat al-Assad (Hafiz's brother and a high-ranking military commander) and Jundi.Шаблон:Sfn The reason for the violence was Rifaat al-Assad's suspicion that Jundi was planning an attempt on Hafiz's life.Шаблон:Sfn The suspected assassin was interrogated and confessed under torture.Шаблон:Sfn Acting on this information, Rifaat al-Assad argued that unless Jundi was removed from his post he and his brother were in danger.Шаблон:Sfn
From 25 to 28 February 1969, the Assad brothers initiated "something just short of a coup".Шаблон:Sfn Under Assad's authority, tanks were moved into Damascus and the staffs of al-Ba'ath and al-Thawra (two-party newspapers) and radio stations in Damascus and Aleppo were replaced with Hafiz loyalists.Шаблон:Sfn Latakia and Tartus, two Alawite-dominated cities, saw "fierce scuffles" ending with the overthrow of Jadid's supporters from local posts.Шаблон:Sfn Shortly afterwards, a wave of arrests of Jundi loyalists began.Шаблон:Sfn On 2 March, after a telephone argument with head of military intelligence Ali Duba, Jundi committed suicide.Шаблон:Sfn When Zu'ayyin heard the news he wept, saying "we are all orphaned now" (referring to his and Jadid's loss of their protector).Шаблон:Sfn Despite his rivalry with Jundi, Hafiz is said to have also wept when he heard the news.Шаблон:Sfn
Hafiz was now in control, but he hesitated to push his advantage.Шаблон:Sfn Jadid continued to rule Syria, and the Regional Command was unchanged.Шаблон:Sfn However, Hafiz influenced Jadid to moderate his policies.Шаблон:Sfn Class struggle was muted, criticism of reactionary tendencies of other Arab states ceased, some political prisoners were freed, a coalition government was formed (with the Ba'ath Party in control) and the Eastern Front—espoused by Hafiz—was formed with Iraq and Jordan.Шаблон:Sfn Jadid's isolationist policies were curtailed, and Syria re-established diplomatic relations with many of its foes.Шаблон:Sfn Around this time, Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt, Houari Boumediene's Algeria and Ba'athist Iraq began sending emissaries to reconcile Hafiz and Jadid.Шаблон:Sfn
Шаблон:Anchor1970 coup d'état
Hafiz began planning to seize power shortly after the failed Syrian military intervention in the Black September, a power struggle between the PLO and the Hashemite monarchy.Шаблон:Sfn While Hafiz had been in de facto command of Syrian politics since 1969, Jadid and his supporters still held the trappings of power.Шаблон:Sfn After attending Nasser's funeral, Hafiz returned to Syria for the Emergency National Congress (held on 30 October).Шаблон:Sfn At the congress Hafiz was condemned by Jadid and his supporters, the majority of the party's delegates.Шаблон:Sfn However, before attending the congress Hafiz ordered his loyal troops to surround the building housing the meeting.Шаблон:Sfn Criticism of Hafiz's political position continued in a defeatist tone, with the majority of delegates believing that they had lost the battle.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz and Tlass were stripped of their government posts at the congress; these acts had little practical significance.Шаблон:Sfn
When the National Congress ended on 12 November 1970, Hafiz ordered loyalists to arrest leading members of Jadid's government.Шаблон:Sfn Although many mid-level officials were offered posts in Syrian embassies abroad, Jadid refused: "If I ever take power, you will be dragged through the streets until you die."Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz imprisoned him in Mezze prison until his death.Шаблон:Sfn The coup was calm and bloodless; the only evidence of change to the outside world was the disappearance of newspapers, radio and television stations.Шаблон:Sfn A Temporary Regional Command was soon established, and on 16 November the new government published its first decree.Шаблон:Sfn
Prime ministership and presidency: 1970–2000
Domestic events and policies
Consolidating power
Шаблон:Main According to Patrick Seale, Hafiz's rule "began with an immediate and considerable advantage: the government he displaced was so detested that any alternative came as a relief".Шаблон:Sfn He first tried to establish national unity, which he felt had been lost under the leadership of Aflaq and Jadid.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz differed from his predecessor at the outset, visiting local villages and hearing citizen complaints.Шаблон:Sfn The Syrian people felt that Hafiz's rise to power would lead to change;Шаблон:Sfn one of his first acts as ruler was to visit Sultan al-Atrash, father of the Aflaqite Ba'athist Mansur al-Atrash, to honor his efforts during the Great Arab Revolution.Шаблон:Sfn He made overtures to the Writers' Union, rehabilitating those who had been forced underground, jailed or sent into exile for representing what radical Ba'athists called the reactionary classes:Шаблон:Sfn "I am determined that you shall no longer feel strangers in your own country."Шаблон:Sfn Although Hafiz did not democratize the country, he eased the government's repressive policies.Шаблон:Sfn
He cut prices for basic foodstuffs 15 percent, which won him support from ordinary citizens.Шаблон:Sfn Jadid's security services were purged, some military criminal investigative powers were transferred to the police, and the confiscation of goods under Jadid was reversed.Шаблон:Sfn Restrictions on travel to and trade with Lebanon were eased, and Hafiz encouraged growth in the private sector.Шаблон:Sfn While Hafiz supported most of Jadid's policies, he proved more pragmatic after he came to power.Шаблон:Sfn
Most of Jadid's supporters faced a choice: continue working for the Ba'ath government under Hafiz, or face repression.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz made it clear from the beginning "that there would be no second chances".Шаблон:Sfn However, later in 1970, he recruited support from the Ba'athist old guard who had supported Aflaq's leadership during the 1963–1966 power struggle.Шаблон:Sfn An estimated 2,000 former Ba'athists rejoined the party after hearing Hafiz's appeal, among them party ideologist Georges Saddiqni and Shakir al-Fahham, a secretary of the founding, 1st National Congress of the Ba'ath Party in 1947.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz ensured that they would not defect to the pro-Aflaqite Ba'ath Party in Iraq with the Treason Trials in 1971, in which he prosecuted Aflaq, Amin al-Hafiz and nearly 100 followers (most in absentia).Шаблон:Sfn The few who were convicted were not imprisoned long, and the trials were primarily symbolic.Шаблон:Sfn
At the 11th National Congress Hafiz assured party members that his leadership was a radical change from that of Jadid, and he would implement a "corrective movement" to return Syria to the true "nationalist socialist line".Шаблон:Sfn Unlike Jadid, Hafiz emphasised "the advancement of which all resources and manpower [would be] mobilised [was to be] the liberation of the occupied territories".Шаблон:Sfn This would mark a major break with his predecessors and would, according to Raymond Hinnebusch, dictate "major alterations in the course of the Ba'thist state".Шаблон:Sfn
Institutionalization
Hafiz turned the presidency, which had been known simply as "head of state" under Jadid, into a position of power during his rule.Шаблон:Sfn In many ways, the presidential authority replaced the Ba'ath Party's failed experiment with organised, military Leninism;Шаблон:Sfn Syria became a hybrid of Leninism and Gaullist constitutionalism.Шаблон:Sfn According to Raymond Hinnebusch, "as the president became the main source of initiative in the government, his personality, values, strengths, and weaknesses became decisive for its direction and stability. Arguably Hafiz's leadership gave the government an enhanced combination of consistency and flexibility which it hitherto lacked."Шаблон:Sfn
Hafiz institutionalised a system where he had the final say, which weakened the powers of the collegial institutions of the state and party.Шаблон:Sfn As fidelity to the leader replaced ideological conviction later in his presidency, corruption became widespread.Шаблон:Sfn The state-sponsored cult of personality became pervasive; as Assad's authority strengthened at his colleagues' expense, he became the sole symbol of the government.Шаблон:SfnШаблон:Sfn
While Assad did not rule alone, he increasingly had the last word;Шаблон:Sfn those with whom he worked eventually became lieutenants, rather than colleagues.Шаблон:Sfn None of the political elite would question a decision of his, and those who did were dismissed.Шаблон:Sfn General Naji Jamil is an example, being dismissed after he disagreed with Hafiz's handling of the Islamist uprising.Шаблон:Sfn The two highest decision-making bodies were the Regional Command and the National Command, both part of the Ba'ath Party.Шаблон:Sfn Joint sessions of these bodies resembled politburos in socialist states which espoused communism.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz headed the National Command and the Regional Command as Secretary General and Regional Secretary, respectively.Шаблон:Sfn The Regional Command was the highest decision-making body in Syria, appointing the president and (through him) the cabinet.Шаблон:Sfn As presidential authority strengthened, the power of the Regional Command and its members evaporated.Шаблон:Sfn The Regional and National Commands were nominally responsible to the Regional Congress and the National Congress—with the National Congress the de jure superior body—but the Regional Congress had de facto authority.Шаблон:Sfn The National Congress, which included delegates from Ba'athist Regional Branches in other countries, has been compared to the Comintern.Шаблон:Sfn It functioned as a session of the Regional Congress focusing on Syria's foreign policy and party ideology.Шаблон:Sfn The Regional Congress had limited accountability until the 1985 Eighth Regional Congress, the last under Hafiz.Шаблон:Sfn In 1985, responsibility for leadership accountability was transferred from the Regional Congress to the weaker National Progressive Front.Шаблон:Sfn
Sectarianism
When Hafiz came to power, he increased Alawite dominance of the security and intelligence sectors to a near-monopoly.Шаблон:Sfn The coercive framework was under his control, weakening the state and party. According to Hinnebusch, the Alawite officers around Hafiz "were pivotal because as personal kinsmen or clients of the president, they combined privileged access to him with positions in the party and control of the levers of coercion. They were, therefore, in an unrivalled position to act as political brokers and, especially in times of crisis, were uniquely placed to shape outcomes".Шаблон:Sfn The leading figures in the Alawite-dominated security system had family connections; Rifaat al-Assad controlled the Struggle Companies, and Assad's son-in-law Adnan Makhlouf was his second-in-command as Commander of the Presidential Guard.Шаблон:Sfn Other prominent figures were Ali Haydar (special-forces head), Ibrahim al-Ali (Popular Army head), Muhammad al-Khuli (head of Hafiz's intelligence-coordination committee) and Military Intelligence head Ali Duba.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz controlled the military through Alawites such as Generals Shafiq Fayadh (commander of the 3rd Division), Ibrahim Safi (commander of the 1st Division) and Adnan Badr Hassan (commander of the 9th Division).Шаблон:Sfn During the 1990s, Hafiz further strengthened Alawite dominance by replacing Sunni General Hikmat al-Shihabi with General Ali Aslan as chief of staff.Шаблон:Sfn The Alawites, with their high status, appointed and promoted based on kinship and favor rather than professional respect.Шаблон:Sfn Therefore, an Alawite elite emerged from these policies.Шаблон:Sfn Anti-Sunni orientation of his Alawite regime also pushed Hafiz to pursue closer relations with Shia Iran.[1]
During the early years of his rule, some of Hafiz's elite had appeared non-sectarian;Шаблон:Sfn prominent Sunni figures at the beginning of his rule were Abdul Halim Khaddam, Shihabi, Naji Jamil, Abdullah al-Ahmar and Mustafa Tlass.Шаблон:Sfn However, none of these people had a power base distinct from that of Hafiz.Шаблон:Sfn Although Sunnis held the positions of Air Force Commander from 1971 to 1994 (Jamil, Subhi Haddad and Ali Malahafji), General Intelligence head from 1970 to 2000 (Adnan Dabbagh, Ali al-Madani, Nazih Zuhayr, Fuad al-Absi and Bashir an-Najjar), Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army from 1974 to 1998 (Shihabi) and defense minister from 1972 until after Hafiz's death (Tlass), none had power separate from Hafiz or the Alawite-dominated security system.Шаблон:Sfn When Jamil headed the Air Force, he could not issue orders without the knowledge of Khuli (the Alawite head of Air Force Intelligence).Шаблон:Sfn After the failed Islamst uprising, Hafiz's reliance on his relatives intensified;Шаблон:Sfn before that, his Sunni colleagues had some autonomy.Шаблон:Sfn A defector from Assad's government said, "Tlass is in the army but at the same time seems as if he is not of the army; he neither binds nor loosens and has no role other than that of the tail in the beast."Шаблон:Sfn Another example was Shihabi, who occasionally represented Assad.Шаблон:Sfn However, he had no control in the Syrian military; Ali Aslan, First Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations during most of his tenure, was responsible for troop maneuvers.Шаблон:Sfn Although the Sunnis were in the forefront, the Alawites had the power.Шаблон:Sfn
Islamist uprising
Background
Hafiz's pragmatic policies indirectly led to the establishment of a "new class",Шаблон:Sfn and he accepted this while it furthered his aims against Israel.Шаблон:Sfn When Hafiz began pursuing a policy of economic liberalization, the state bureaucracy began using their positions for personal gain.Шаблон:Sfn The state gave implementation rights to "much of its development program to foreign firms and contractors, fueling a growing linkage between the state and private capital".Шаблон:Sfn What ensued was a spike in corruption, which led the political class to be "thoroughly embourgeoised".Шаблон:Sfn The channeling of external money through the state to private enterprises "created growing opportunities for state elites' self-enrichment through corrupt manipulation of state-market interchanges. Besides outright embezzlement, webs of shared interests in commissions and kickbacks grew up between high officials, politicians, and business interests".Шаблон:Sfn The Alawite military-security establishment got the greatest share of the money;Шаблон:Sfn the Ba'ath Party and its leaders ruled a new class, defending their interests instead of those of peasants and workers (whom they were supposed to represent).Шаблон:Sfn This, coupled with growing Sunni disillusionment with what Hinnebusch calls "the regime's mixture of statism, rural and sectarian favouritism, corruption and new inequalities", fueled the growth of the Islamic movement.Шаблон:Sfn Because of this, the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria became the vanguard of anti-Ba'athist forces.Шаблон:Sfn
The Brotherhood had historically been a vehicle for moderate Islam during its introduction to the Syrian political scene during the 1960s under the leadership of Mustafa al-Siba'i.Шаблон:Sfn After Siba'i's imprisonment, under Isam al-Attar's leadership the Brotherhood developed into the ideological antithesis of Ba'athist rule.Шаблон:Sfn However, the Ba'ath Party's organizational superiority worked in its favor;Шаблон:Sfn with Attar's enforced exile, the Muslim Brotherhood was in disarray.Шаблон:Sfn It was not until the 1970s that the Muslim Brotherhood established a clear, central collective authority for its organization under Adnan Saad ad-Din, Sa'id Hawwa, Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni and Husni Abu.Шаблон:Sfn Because of their organizational capabilities, the Muslim Brotherhood grew tenfold from 1975 to 1978 (from 500 to 700 in Aleppo); nationwide, by 1978 it had 30,000 followers.Шаблон:Sfn
Events
The Islamist uprising began in the mid-to-late 1970s, with attacks on prominent members of the Ba'ath Alawite elite.Шаблон:Sfn As the conflict worsened, a debate in the party between hard-liners (represented by Rifaat al-Assad) and Ba'ath liberals (represented by Mahmoud al-Ayyubi) began.Шаблон:Sfn The Seventh Regional Congress, in 1980, was held in an atmosphere of crisis.Шаблон:Sfn The party leadership—with the exception of Hafiz and his proteges—were criticised severely by party delegates, who called for an anti-corruption campaign, a new, clean government, curtailing the powers of the military-security apparatus and political liberalization.Шаблон:Sfn With Hafiz's consent, a new government (headed by the presumably clean Abdul Rauf al-Kasm) was established with new, young technocrats.Шаблон:Sfn The new government failed to assuage critics, and the Sunni middle class and the radical left (believing that Ba'athist rule could be overthrown with an uprising) began collaborating with the Islamists.Шаблон:Sfn
Believing they had the upper hand in the conflict, beginning in 1980 the Islamists began a series of campaigns against government installations in Aleppo;Шаблон:Sfn the attacks became urban guerrilla warfare.Шаблон:Sfn The government began to lose control in the city and, inspired by events, similar disturbances spread to Hama, Homs, Idlib, Latakia, Deir ez-Zor, Maaret-en-Namen and Jisr esh-Shagour.Шаблон:Sfn Those affected by Ba'athist repression began to rally behind the insurgents; Ba'ath Party co-founder Bitar supported the uprising, rallying the old, anti-military Ba'athists.Шаблон:Sfn The increasing threat to the government's survival strengthened the hard-liners, who favored repression over concessions.Шаблон:Sfn Security forces began to purge all state, party and social institutions in Syria, and were sent to the northern provinces to quell the uprising.Шаблон:Sfn When this failed, the hard-liners began accusing the United States of fomenting the uprising and called for the reinstatement of "revolutionary vigilance".Шаблон:Sfn The hard-liners won the debate after a failed attempt on Hafiz's life in June 1980,Шаблон:Sfn and began responding to the uprising with state terrorism later that year.Шаблон:Sfn Under Rifaat al-Assad Islamic prisoners at the Tadmur prison were massacred, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood became a capital offence and the government sent a death squad to kill Bitar and Attar's former wife.Шаблон:Sfn The military court began condemning captured prisoners, which "sometimes degenerated into indiscriminate killings".Шаблон:Sfn Little care was taken to distinguish Muslim Brotherhood hard-liners from their passive supporters,Шаблон:Sfn and violence was met with violence.Шаблон:Sfn
The final showdown, the Hama massacre. took place in February 1982Шаблон:Sfn when the government crushed the uprising.Шаблон:Sfn Helicopter gunships, bulldozers, and artillery bombardment razed the city, killing thousands of people.Шаблон:Sfn The Ba'ath government withstood the uprising, not because of popular support, but because the opposition was disorganised and had little urban support.Шаблон:Sfn Throughout the uprising, the Sunni middle class continued to support the Ba'ath Party because of its dislike of political Islam.Шаблон:Sfn After the uprising the government resumed its version of militaristic Leninism, reverting the liberalization introduced when Hafiz came to power.Шаблон:Sfn The Ba'ath Party was weakened by the uprising; democratic elections for delegates to the Regional and National Congresses were halted, and open discussion within the party ended.Шаблон:Sfn The uprising made Syria more totalitarian than ever, and strengthened Hafiz's position as undisputed leader of Syria.Шаблон:Sfn
Шаблон:Anchor1983–1984 succession crisis
In November 1983 Hafiz, a diabetic,Шаблон:Sfn had a heart attack complicated by phlebitis; this triggered a succession crisis.Шаблон:Sfn On 13 November, after visiting his brother in the hospital,Шаблон:Sfn Rifaat al-Assad reportedly announced his candidacy for president; he did not believe Hafiz would be able to continue ruling the country.Шаблон:Sfn When he did not receive support from Hafiz's inner circle, he made, in the words of historian Hanna Batatu, "abominably lavish" promises to win them over.Шаблон:Sfn
Until his 1985 ouster, Rifaat al-Assad was considered the face of corruption by the Syrian people.Шаблон:Sfn Although highly paid as Commander of Defense Companies, he accumulated unexplained wealth.Шаблон:Sfn According to Batatu, "there is no way that he could have permissibly accumulated the vast sums needed for the investments he made in real estate in Syria, Europe and the United States".Шаблон:Sfn
Although it is unclear if any top officials supported Rifaat al-Assad, most did not.Шаблон:Sfn He lacked his brother's stature and charisma, and was vulnerable to charges of corruption.Шаблон:Sfn His 50,000-strong Defense Companies were viewed with suspicion by the upper leadership and throughout society;Шаблон:Sfn they were considered corrupt, poorly disciplined and indifferent to human suffering.Шаблон:Sfn Rifaat al-Assad also lacked military support;Шаблон:Sfn officers and soldiers resented the Defense Companies' monopoly of Damascus' security, their separate intelligence services and prisons and their higher pay.Шаблон:Sfn He did not abandon the hope of succeeding his brother, opting to take control of the country through his post as Commander of Defense Companies.Шаблон:Sfn In what became known as the "poster war", personnel from the Defense Companies replaced posters of Hafiz in Damascus with those of Rifaat al-Assad.Шаблон:Sfn The security service, still loyal to Hafiz, responded by replacing Rifaat al-Assad's posters with Hafiz's.Шаблон:Sfn The poster war lasted for a week until Hafiz's health improved.Шаблон:Sfn
Shortly after the poster war, all Rifaat al-Assad's proteges were removed from positions of power.Шаблон:Sfn This decree nearly sparked a clash between the Defense Companies and the Republican Guard on 27 February 1984, but conflict was avoided by Rifaat al-Assad's appointment as one of three Vice Presidents on 11 March.Шаблон:Sfn He acquired this post by surrendering his position as Commander of Defense Companies to an Hafiz supporter.Шаблон:Sfn Rifaat al-Assad was succeeded as Defense Companies head by his son-in-law.Шаблон:Sfn During the night of 30 March, he ordered Defense Company loyalists to seal Damascus off and advance to the city.Шаблон:Sfn The Republican Guard was put on alert in Damascus, and 3rd Armored Division commander Shafiq Fayadh ordered troops outside Damascus to encircle the Defense Companies blocking the roads into the city.Шаблон:Sfn Rifaat al-Assad's plan might have succeeded if Special Forces commander Ali Haydar supported him, but Haydar sided with the president.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz punished Rifaat al-Assad with exile, allowing him to return in later years without a political role.Шаблон:Sfn The Defense Companies were reduced by 30,000–35,000 people,Шаблон:Sfn and their role was assumed by the Republican Guard.Шаблон:Sfn Makhluf, the Republican Guard commander was promoted to major general, and Basil al-Assad (Assad's son, an army major) became influential in the guard.Шаблон:Sfn
Economy
Hafiz called his domestic reforms a corrective movement, and it achieved some results. He tried to modernize Syria's agricultural and industrial sectors; one of his main achievements was the completion of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates River in 1974. One of the world's largest dams, its reservoir was called Lake al-Assad. The reservoir increased the irrigation of arable land, provided electricity, and encouraged industrial and technical development in Syria. Many peasants and workers received increased income, social security, and better health and educational services. The urban middle class, which had been hurt by the Jadid government's policy, had new economic opportunities.Шаблон:Sfn
By 1977 it was apparent that despite some success, Hafiz's political reforms had largely failed. This was partly due to Hafiz's foreign policy, failed policies, natural phenomena, and corruption. Chronic socioeconomic difficulties remained, and new ones appeared. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption in the government, public, and private sectors, illiteracy, poor education (particularly in rural areas), increasing emigration by professionals, inflation, a growing trade deficit, a high cost of living and shortages of consumer goods were among problems faced by the country. The financial burden of Syria's involvement in Lebanon since 1976 contributed to worsening economic problems, encouraging corruption and a black market. The emerging class of entrepreneurs and brokers became involved with senior military officers—including Assad's brother Rifaat—in smuggling from Lebanon, which affected government revenue and encouraged corruption among senior government officials.Шаблон:Sfn
During the early 1980s, Syria's economy worsened; by mid-1984, the food crisis was severe, and the press was full of complaints. Hafiz's government sought a solution, arguing that food shortages could be avoided with careful economic planning. The food crisis continued through August, despite government measures. Syria lacked sugar, bread, flour, wood, iron, and construction equipment; this resulted in soaring prices, long queues and rampant black marketeering. Smuggling goods from Lebanon became common. Hafiz's government tried to combat the smuggling, encountering difficulties due to the involvement of his brother Rifaat in the corruption. In July 1984, the government formed an effective anti-smuggling squad to control the Lebanon–Syria borders. The Defense Detachment commanded by Rifaat al-Assad played a leading role in the smuggling, importing $400,000 worth of goods a day. The anti-smuggling squad seized $3.8 million in goods during its first week.Шаблон:Sfn
The Syrian economy grew five to seven percent during the early 1990s; exports increased, the balance of trade improved, inflation remained moderate (15–18 percent) and oil exports increased. In May 1991 Hafiz's government liberalised the Syrian economy, which stimulated domestic and foreign private investment. Most foreign investors were Arab states around the Persian Gulf since Western countries still had political and economic issues with the country. The Gulf states invested in infrastructure and development projects; because of the Ba'ath Party's socialist ideology, Hafiz's government did not privatize state-owned companies.Шаблон:Sfn
Syria fell into recession during the mid-1990s. Several years later, its economic growth was about 1.5 percent. This was insufficient since population growth was between 3 and 3.5 percent. Another symptom of the crisis was statism in foreign trade. Syria's economic crisis coincided with a recession in world markets. A 1998 drop in oil prices dealt a major blow to Syria's economy; when oil prices rose the following year, the Syrian economy partially recovered. In 1999, one of the worst droughts in a century caused a drop of 25–30 percent in crop yields compared with 1997 and 1998. Hafiz's government implemented emergency measures, including loans and compensation to farmers and the distribution of free fodder to save sheep and cattle. However, those steps were limited and had no measurable effect on the economy.Шаблон:Sfn
Hafiz's government tried to decrease population growth, but this was only marginally successful. One sign of economic stagnation was Syria's lack of progress in talks with the EU on an agreement. The main cause of this failure was the country's difficulty in meeting EU demands to open the economy and introduce reforms. Marc Pierini, head of the EU delegation in Damascus, said that if the Syrian economy was not modernised it would not benefit from closer ties to the EU. Hafiz's government gave civil servants a 20-percent pay raise on the anniversary of the corrective movement that brought him to power. Although the foreign press criticised Syria's reluctance to liberalize its economy, Hafiz's government refused to modernize the bank system, permit private banks and open a stock exchange.Шаблон:Sfn
Foreign policy
Yom Kippur War
Planning
Since the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War, Hafiz was convinced that the Israelis had won the war by subterfuge;Шаблон:Sfn after gaining power, his top foreign-policy priority was to regain the Arab territory lost in the war.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz reaffirmed Syria's rejection of the 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242 because he believed it stood for the "liquidation of the Palestine question".Шаблон:Sfn He believed, and continued to believe until long into his rule, that the only way to get Israel to negotiate with the Arabs was through war.Шаблон:Sfn
When Hafiz took power, Syria was isolated;Шаблон:Sfn planning an attack on Israel, he sought allies and war material.Шаблон:Sfn Ten weeks after gaining power, Hafiz visited the Soviet Union.Шаблон:Sfn The Soviet leadership was wary of supplying the Syrian government, viewing Hafiz's rise to power with a reserve and believing him to lean further West than Jadid did.Шаблон:Sfn While he soon understood that the Soviet relationship with the Arabs would never be as deep as the United States' relationship with Israel, he needed its weapons.Шаблон:Sfn Unlike his predecessors (who tried to win Soviet support with socialist policies), Hafiz was willing to give the Soviets a stable presence in the Middle East through Syria, access to Syrian naval bases (giving them a role in the peace process) and help in curtailing American influence in the region.Шаблон:Sfn The Soviets responded by sending arms to Syria.Шаблон:Sfn The new relationship bore fruit, and between February 1971 and October 1973 Hafiz met several times with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.Шаблон:Sfn
Hafiz believed that Syria would have no chance in a war against Israel without Egyptian participation.Шаблон:Sfn He believed that if the United Arab Republic had not collapsed, the Arabs would already have liberated Palestine.Шаблон:Sfn For a war against Israel, Syria needed to establish another front.Шаблон:Sfn However, by this time Syria's relations with Egypt and Jordan were shaky at best.Шаблон:Sfn Planning for war began in 1971 with an agreement between Hafiz and Anwar Sadat.Шаблон:Sfn In the beginning, the renewed Egyptian–Syrian alliance was based upon the proposed Federation of Arab Republics (FAR), a federation initially encompassing Egypt, Libya, Sudan (which left soon after FAR's first summit) and Syria.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz and Sadat used the FAR summits to plan war strategy, and by 1971 they had appointed Egyptian General Muhammad Sadiq supreme commander of both armies.Шаблон:Sfn From 1972 to 1973, the countries filled their arsenals and trained their armies.Шаблон:Sfn In a secret meeting of the Egyptian–Syrian Military Council from 21 to 23 August 1973, the two chiefs of staff (Syrian Youssef Chakkour and Egyptian Saad el-Shazly) signed a document declaring their intention to go to war against Israel.Шаблон:Sfn During a meeting of Hafiz, Sadat and their respective defense ministers (Tlass and Hosni Mubarak) on 26–27 August, the two leaders decided to go to war together.Шаблон:Sfn
Egypt went to war for a reason different from Syria’s.Шаблон:Sfn While Hafiz wanted to regain lost Arab territory, Sadat wished to strengthen Egypt's position in its peace policy toward Israel.Шаблон:Sfn The Syrians were deceived by Sadat and the Egyptians, which would play a major role in the Arab defeat.Шаблон:Sfn Egyptian Chief of Staff Shazly was convinced from the beginning that Egypt could not mount a successful full-scale offensive against Israel; therefore, he campaigned for a limited war.Шаблон:Sfn Sadat knew that Hafiz would not participate in the war if he knew his real intentions.Шаблон:Sfn Since the collapse of the UAR, the Egyptians were critical of the Ba'athist government; they saw it as an untrustworthy ally.Шаблон:Sfn
The war
At 14:05 on 6 October 1973, Egyptian forces (attacking through the Sinai Peninsula) and Syrian forces (attacking the Golan Heights) crossed the border into Israel and penetrated the Israeli defense lines.Шаблон:Sfn The Syrian forces on the Golan Heights met with more intense fighting than their Egyptian counterparts, but by 8 October had broken through the Israeli defenses.Шаблон:Sfn The early successes of the Syrian army were due to its officer corps (where officers were promoted because of merit and not politics) and its ability to handle advanced Soviet weaponry: tanks, artillery batteries, aircraft, man-portable missiles, the Sagger anti-tank weapon and the 2K12 Kub anti-aircraft system on mobile launchers.Шаблон:Sfn With the help of these weapons, Egypt and Syria defeated Israel's armor and air supremacy.Шаблон:Sfn Egypt and Syria announced the war to the world first, accusing Israel of starting it, mindful of the importance of avoiding appearing as the aggressor (Israel accused the Arab powers of starting the Six-Day War when they launched Operation Focus).Шаблон:Sfn In any case, early Syrian successes helped rectify the loss of face they had suffered following the Six-Day War.
The main reason for the reversal of fortune was Egypt's operational pause from 7 to 14 October.Шаблон:Sfn After capturing parts of the Sinai, the Egyptian campaign halted and the Syrians were left fighting the Israelis alone.Шаблон:Sfn The Egyptian leaders, believing their war aims accomplished, dug in.Шаблон:Sfn While their early successes in the war had surprised them, War Minister General Ahmad Ismail Ali advised caution.Шаблон:Sfn In Syria, Hafiz and his generals waited for the Egyptians to move.Шаблон:Sfn When the Israeli government learned of Egypt's modest war strategy, it ordered an "immediate continuous action" against the Syrian military.Шаблон:Sfn According to Patrick Seale, "For three days, 7, 8, and 9 October, Syrian troops on the Golan faced the full fury of the Israeli air force as, from first light to nightfall, wave after wave of aircraft swooped down to bomb, strafe and napalm their tank concentration and their fuel and ammunition carriers right back to the Purple Line."Шаблон:Sfn By 9 October, the Syrians were retreating behind the Purple Line (the Israeli–Syrian border since the Six-Day War).Шаблон:Sfn By 13 October the war was lost, but (in contrast to the Six-Day War) the Syrians were not crushed; this earned Hafiz respect in Syria and abroad.Шаблон:Sfn
On 14 October, Egypt began a limited offensive against Israel for political reasons.Шаблон:Sfn Sadat needed Hafiz on his side for his peace policy with Israel to succeed,Шаблон:Sfn and military action as a means to an end.Шаблон:Sfn The renewed Egyptian military offensive was ill-conceived. A week later, due to Egyptian inactivity, the Israelis had organised and the Arabs had lost their most important advantage.Шаблон:Sfn While the military offensive gave Hafiz hope, this was an illusion; the Arabs had already lost the war militarily.Шаблон:Sfn Egypt's behavior during the war caused friction between Hafiz and Sadat.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz, still inexperienced in foreign policy, believed that the Egyptian–Syrian alliance was based on trust and failed to understand Egypt's duplicity.Шаблон:Sfn Although it was not until after the war that Hafiz would learn that Sadat was in contact with American National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger almost daily during the war, the seeds of distrust had been sown.Шаблон:Sfn Around this time, Sadat called for an American-led ceasefire agreement between Egypt, Syria, and Israel; however, he was unaware that under Kissinger's tenure the United States had become a staunch supporter of Israel.Шаблон:Sfn
On 16 October, Sadat—without telling Hafiz—called for a ceasefire in a speech to the People's Assembly, the Egyptian legislative body.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz was not only surprised but could not comprehend why Sadat trusted "American goodwill for a satisfactory result".Шаблон:Sfn Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Cairo, urging Sadat to accept a ceasefire without the condition of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.Шаблон:Sfn While Sadat was reluctant at first, Kosygin returned on 18 October with satellite images showing 300 Israeli tanks in Egyptian territory.Шаблон:Sfn The blow to Sadat's morale was such that he sent a cable to Hafiz, obliquely saying that all hope was lost.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz, who was in a better position, was still optimistic.Шаблон:Sfn Under Soviet influence, Egypt called for a ceasefire on 22 October 1973, direct negotiations between the warring parties and the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 242.Шаблон:Sfn The ceasefire resolution did not call for Israeli withdrawal from its occupied territories.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz was annoyed since he had not been informed beforehand of Sadat's change in policy (which affected them both).Шаблон:Sfn On 23 October the Syrian government accepted the ceasefire, spelling out its understanding of UN Resolution 338 (withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories and the safeguarding of Palestinian rights).Шаблон:Sfn
Lebanese Civil War
Syria intervened in Lebanon in 1976 during the civil war, which began in 1975.Шаблон:Sfn With the Egyptian–Israeli peace accords, Syria was the only neighboring state which threatened Israel.Шаблон:Sfn Syria initially tried to mediate the conflict; when that failed, Hafiz ordered the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA),Шаблон:Sfn a regular force based in Syria with Syrian officers,Шаблон:Sfn troops into Lebanon to restore order.Шаблон:Sfn Around this time, the Israeli government opened its borders to Maronite refugees in Lebanon to strengthen its regional influence.Шаблон:Sfn Clashes between the Syria-loyal PLA and militants occurred throughout the country.Шаблон:Sfn Despite Syrian support and Khaddam's mediation, Rashid Karami (the Sunni Muslim Prime Minister of Lebanon) did not have enough support to appoint a cabinet.Шаблон:Sfn
In early 1976 Hafiz was approached by Lebanese politicians for help in forcing the resignation of Suleiman Frangieh, the Christian President of Lebanon.Шаблон:Sfn Although Hafiz was open to change, he resisted attempts by some Lebanese politicians to enlist him in Frangieh's ouster;Шаблон:Sfn when General Abdul Aziz al-Ahdāb attempted to seize power, Syrian troops stopped him.Шаблон:Sfn In the meantime, radical Lebanese leftists were gaining the upper hand in the military conflict.Шаблон:Sfn Kamal Jumblatt, leader of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), believed that his strong military position would compel Frangieh's resignation.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz did not wish a leftist victory in Lebanon which would strengthen the position of the Palestinians.Шаблон:Sfn He did not want a rightist victory either, instead of seeking a middle-ground solution which would safeguard Lebanon and the region.Шаблон:Sfn When Jumblatt met with Hafiz on 27 March 1976, he tried to persuade him to let him "win" the war;Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz replied that a ceasefire should be in effect to ensure the 1976 presidential elections.Шаблон:Sfn Meanwhile, on Hafiz's orders Syria sent troops into Lebanon without international approval.Шаблон:Sfn
While Yasser Arafat and the PLO had not officially taken a side in the conflict, several PLO members were fighting with the LNM.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz attempted to steer Arafat and the PLO away from Lebanon, threatening him with a cutoff of Syrian aid.Шаблон:Sfn The two sides were unable to reach an agreement.Шаблон:Sfn When Frangieh stepped down in 1976, Syria pressured Lebanese members of parliament to elect Elias Sarkis president.Шаблон:Sfn One-third of the Lebanese members of parliament (primarily supporters of Raymond Edde) boycotted the election to protest American and Syrian interference.Шаблон:Sfn
On 31 May 1976, Syria began a full-scale intervention in Lebanon to (according to the official Syrian account) end bombardment of the Maronite cities of Qubayat and Aandqat.Шаблон:Sfn Before the intervention, Hafiz and the Syrian government were one of several interests in Lebanon; afterward, they were the controlling factors in Lebanese politics.Шаблон:Sfn On Hafiz's orders, the Syrian troop presence slowly increased to 30,000.Шаблон:Sfn Syria received approval for the intervention from the United States and Israel to help them defeat Palestinian forces in Lebanon.Шаблон:Sfn The Ba'athist group As-Sa'iqa and the PLA's Hittīn brigade fought Palestinians who sided with the LNM.Шаблон:Sfn
Within a week of the Syrian intervention, Christian leaders issued a statement of support.Шаблон:Sfn
Muslim leaders established a joint command of all Palestinian groups except As-Sa'iqa,Шаблон:Sfn which was driven by the PLO to its stronghold near the main airport.Шаблон:Sfn Shortly afterward, As-Sa'iqa and other leftist Damascus forces were absorbed by the Syrian military.Шаблон:Sfn On 8 June 1976 Syrian forces were pushed back from Sidon, encountering stiff resistance in Beirut from the LNM.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz's actions angered much of the Arab world however and the sight of Syria trying to eliminate the PLO brought criticism upon him.Шаблон:Sfn There was considerable hostility to Hafiz's alliance with the Maronites in Syria.Шаблон:Sfn As a result, the Syrian government asked the Arab League to assist in the conflict.Шаблон:Sfn The Arab League began to meditate, establishing the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) for peacekeeping.Шаблон:Sfn Syrian strategy at this point was to gradually weaken the LNM and its Palestinian collaborators, continuing to support the Christian militia.Шаблон:Sfn However, the Syrians were unable to capture the LNM's stronghold of Aley before the Arab League called for a ceasefire on 17 October.Шаблон:Sfn The Arab League strengthened the ADF to 30,000 troops, most Syrian.Шаблон:Sfn While some heavy fighting continued, by December 1976 and January 1977 most Palestinian and Lebanese groups had disposed of their heavy weaponry.Шаблон:Sfn According to Charles Winslow, the "main phase" of the Lebanese Civil War had ended by 1977; until the early 1990s most violence was attributed to the turf, proxy, inter-communal and state wars.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz used terrorism and intimidation to extend his control over Lebanon.Шаблон:Sfn Jumblatt died in a 1977 assassination allegedly ordered by Syria; in 1982, Syrian agents assassinated Lebanese President Bachir Gemayel (who was helped to power by the Israelis during the 1982 Lebanon War).Шаблон:Sfn Jumblatt and Gemayel had resisted Hafiz's attempts to dominate Lebanon.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz caused the failure of the 1983 Lebanon–Israel agreement, and by proxy guerrilla warfare forced the Israeli Defense Forces to withdraw to southern Lebanon in 1985.Шаблон:Sfn Terrorism against Palestinians and Jordanian targets during the mid-1980s thwarted the rapprochement between King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO, slowing Jordanian–Israeli cooperation in the West Bank.Шаблон:Sfn
Autocracy, succession, and death
Hafiz's first choice of successor was his brother Rifaat al-Assad, an idea he broached as early as 1980,Шаблон:Sfn and his brother's coup attempt weakened the institutionalised power structure on which he based his rule.Шаблон:Sfn Instead of changing his policy, Hafiz tried to protect his power by honing his governmental model.Шаблон:Sfn He gave a larger role to Basil al-Assad, who was rumored to be his father's planned successor;Шаблон:Sfn this kindled jealousy within the government.Шаблон:Sfn At a 1994 military meeting, Chief of Staff Shihabi said that since Hafiz wanted to normalize relations with Israel, the Syrian military had to withdraw its troops from the Golan Heights. Haydar replied angrily, "We have become nonentities. We were not even consulted."Шаблон:Sfn When he heard about Haydar's outburst, Hafiz replaced Haydar as Commander of Special Forces with the Alawite Major General Ali Habib.Шаблон:Sfn Haydar also reportedly opposed dynastic succession, keeping his views secret until after Basil's death in 1994 (when Hafiz chose Bashar al-Assad to succeed him);Шаблон:Sfn he then openly criticised Hafiz's succession plans.Шаблон:Sfn
Abdul Halim Khaddam, Syria's foreign minister from 1970 to 1984, opposed dynastic succession on the grounds that it was not socialist.Шаблон:Sfn Khaddam has said that Hafiz never discussed his intentions about succession with members of the Regional Command.Шаблон:Sfn By the 1990s, the Sunni faction of the leadership was aging; the Alawites, with Hafiz's help, had received new blood.Шаблон:Sfn The Sunnis were at a disadvantage since many were opposed to any kind of dynastic succession.Шаблон:Sfn
Шаблон:Quote box When he returned to Syria, Bashar al-Assad enrolled in the Homs Military Academy.Шаблон:Sfn He was quickly promoted to Brigadier Commander, and served for a time in the Republican Guard.Шаблон:Sfn He studied most military subjects, "including a tank battalion commander, command and staff"Шаблон:Sfn (the latter two of which were required for a senior command in the Syrian army).Шаблон:Sfn Bashar al-Assad was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1997, and to colonel in January 1999.Шаблон:Sfn Official sources ascribe Bashar's rapid promotion to his "overall excellence in the staff officers' course, and in the outstanding final project he submitted as part of the course for command and staff".Шаблон:Sfn With Bashar's training, Hafiz appointed a new generation of Alawite security officers to secure his succession plans.Шаблон:Sfn Shihabi's replacement by Aslan as Chief of Staff on 1 July 1998—Shihabi was considered a potential successor by the outside world—marked the end of the long security-apparatus overhaul.Шаблон:Sfn
Skepticism of Hafiz's dynastic-succession plan was widespread within and outside the government, with critics noting that Syria was not a monarchy.Шаблон:Sfn By 1998 Bashar al-Assad had made inroads into the Ba'ath Party, taking over Khaddam's Lebanon portfolio (a post he had held since the 1970s).Шаблон:Sfn By December 1998 Bashar al-Assad had replaced Rafiq al-Hariri, Prime Minister of Lebanon and one of Khaddam's proteges, with Salim al-Huss.Шаблон:Sfn Several Hafiz proteges, who had served since 1970 or earlier, were dismissed from office between 1998 and 2000.Шаблон:Sfn They were sacked not because of disloyalty to Hafiz, but because Hafiz thought they would not fully support Bashar al-Assad's succession.Шаблон:Sfn "Retirees" included Muhammad al-Khuli, Nassir Khayr Bek and Ali Duba.Шаблон:Sfn Among the new appointees (Bashar loyalists) were Bahjat Sulayman, Major General Hassan Khalil and Major General Assef Shawkat (Assad's son-in-law).Шаблон:Sfn
By the late 1990s, Hafiz's health had deteriorated.Шаблон:Sfn American diplomats said Hafiz had difficulty staying focused and seemed tired during their meetings;Шаблон:Sfn he was seen as incapable of functioning for more than two hours a day.Шаблон:Sfn Because of his increasing seclusion from state affairs, the government became accustomed to working without his involvement in day-to-day affairs.Шаблон:Sfn Nearly all of his administrative tasks and even much of the important decision making was allegedly being delegated to his daughter, Bushra, who set up her own office next to her father in the Presidential Palace.Шаблон:Sfn Bushra, long believed to have been Hafiz's favorite child and, had it not been for her sex, preferred candidate for succession, had a negative view towards Bashar's ability to succeed Hafiz and was allegedly mounting her own attempt at amassing power to succeed him.Шаблон:Sfn His spokesperson ignored the speculation, and Hafiz's official routine in 1999 was basically unchanged from the previous decade.Шаблон:Sfn Hafiz continued to conduct meetings, traveling abroad occasionally; he visited Moscow in July 1999.Шаблон:Sfn On 26 March 2000, Hafiz embarked on another rare foreign trip to Geneva to meet with American president Bill Clinton.[2]
On 10 June 2000, at the age of 69, Hafiz al-Assad died of a heart attack while on the telephone with Lebanese prime minister al-Huss.Шаблон:Sfn 40 days of mourning was declared in Syria and 7 days in Lebanon thereafter.[3] His funeral was held three days later.Шаблон:Sfn Assad is buried with his son, Basil, in a mausoleum in his hometown of Qardaha.Шаблон:Sfn After Hafiz al-Assad's death, power was transferred to his son Bashar with the support of Ba'ath loyalists, making Syria the first Arab republic to establish a dynastic system.Шаблон:Sfn
Foreign honours
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- Файл:POL Polonia Restituta Wielki BAR.svg Grand Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta[5]
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Notes
References
Citations
Sources
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