Английская Википедия:Far-right politics in Ukraine

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Шаблон:Short description During Ukraine's post-Soviet history, the far-right has remained on the political periphery and been largely excluded from national politics since independence in 1991.[1]Шаблон:Sfn Unlike most Eastern European countries which saw far-right groups become permanent fixtures in their countries' politics during the decline and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the national electoral support for far-right parties in Ukraine only rarely exceeded 3% of the popular vote.[2] Far-right parties usually enjoyed just a few wins in single-mandate districts, and no far right candidate for president has ever secured more than 5 percent of the popular vote in an election.[2] Only once in the 1994–2014 period was a radical right-wing party elected to the parliament as an independent organization within the proportional part of the voting: Svoboda in 2012.[2] Since then far-right parties have failed to gain enough votes to attain political representation, even at the height of nationalist sentiment during and after Russia's annexation of Crimea and the Russo-Ukrainian War.[2]

The far-right was heavily represented among the pro-Russian separatists with several past or current leaders of the republics of Donetsk and Luhansk linked to various neo-Nazi, white supremacist and ultra-nationalist groups. The importance of the far-right on both sides of the conflict declined over time. In the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election, the coalition of Svoboda and the other extreme-right political parties in Ukraine―National Corps, the Governmental Initiative of Yarosh, and the Right Sector―won only 2.15% of the vote combined and failed to pass the 5% threshold. As a result, no party was able to win a proportional seat.[3][4] One party – the Svoboda party – was able to secure a single constituency seat.[5]

Background

Файл:115th Battalion of Ukrainian Shuma 1943 (2).jpg
Schutzmannschaft with Nazi uniform and the logo of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

The far-right in Ukraine is not identical with Ukrainian nationalism which resulted in part from Ukraine being historically divided between various imperial powers.[6] Post-Soviet Ukraine is home to competing nationalisms and cultural orientations.[7] The nationalist organizations during World War II remain controversial.[7] National attitudes about the far-right are impacted by the ambivalent role Ukraine played during Nazi occupation, with Ukrainians volunteering in SS troops and as concentration camp guards.Шаблон:Sfn

Hate crime

Файл:Maidan Kiev 2014-04-13 11-48.JPG
Ukrainian Right Sector extremists wearing the Wolfsangel on Maidan. 2014

Hate crimes were relatively uncommon in Ukraine compared to other Eastern European countries, with increase after 2005,Шаблон:Sfn and decrease after 2008 - 2009. The increase was mostly due to informal youth groups, in particular skinheads. 2007 was the most violent year in terms of racially motivated crimes with 88 registered assaults with 6 fatalities.[8] By comparison, in Russia during the same year there were a reported 625 casualties with 94 deaths attributed to far-right violence.[8] The significant difference results in part the from the different sizes of the racist youth and skinhead scene in Ukraine and Russia.[8] According to estimates, in 2008 Ukraine had a maximum of 2,000 organized skinheads whereas in Russia the estimates range between 20,000 and 70,000 members of skinhead groups.[9][10] Since 2008, there has been a more explicit response to such crimes by law enforcement and the justice system, which has led to a decrease of violent right-wing offences.Шаблон:Sfn Ukraine has seen a decrease in both the frequency and the severity of hate crimes since their high in the mid-2000s.[8] Between 2006 and 2012, there were 295 reported violent hate crimes and 13 hate-crime-related deaths, the last reported death occurred in 2010 before the start of the war with Russia.[8]

In 2008, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, issued an open letter complaining about the radical right-wing organization Patriot of Ukraine which according to the author had close ties to Russian and Ukrainian extremists. The author warned that the spread of extremist ideology was reminiscent of that in Russia 2000-2001.[11]

In 2018, Human Rights Watch issued a letter stating that, in the months preceding the letter's publication, there have been a series of hate-motivated violent incidents and harassment by radical groups against LGBT people, Roma people, feminists and rights activists. According to the letter, the violent incidents were not prosecuted adequately by the Ukrainian authorities.[12] According to a 2018 report by Freedom House, in the first three months of 2018, extremist groups tried to disrupt twelve public events and attacked a variety of targets. While direct physical violence was not deployed in all twelve cases, extremist groups sought to restrict the rights and freedoms of Ukraine's citizens. Overall, the report argues that far-right groups have been marginal in Ukrainian society and especially in Ukrainian politics.Шаблон:Sfn The 2018 report by Freedom House concluded that far-right groups in Ukraine had no significant representation in parliament nor any plausible path to power, however they had "a serious impact on everyday life and societal development in the country." The report identified three extremist political parties―Svoboda, National Corps and Right Sector—and argues that their lack of relevance in official politics has resulted in right-wing groups seeking avenues outside of politics to impose their agenda on Ukrainian society. Such attempts have included efforts to disrupt peaceful assemblies and violence against those with opposite political and cultural views including the left, feminists, LGBT groups, and human rights activists. One particular area of concern noted in the report is that Ukrainian law enforcement had failed to properly stop or punish far-right disruption. The report called on Ukrainian authorities to take more effective measures.Шаблон:Sfn

In 2019, a Bellingcat investigation revealed that the Ukrainian government gave over 8 million hryvnias (over US$300,000)) for "national-patriotic education projects" targeting Ukrainian youth. A proportion of this (845,000 hryvnias — over $30,000) went to several far-right nationalist groups, including National Corps and possible fronts for C14.[13]

Violence against Jews

Шаблон:Main A survey by the Pew Research Center in 2018 found that antisemitic sentiments were less prevalent in Ukraine than other Eastern and Central European countries. While 5% of Ukrainians stated that they would not like to have Jews as their fellow citizens, the figure was 14% in Russia and Hungary, 16% in Greece and 32% in Armenia.[14] According to a 2023 survey by the Anti-Defamation League Ukraine has a 29% index score (answering 'probably true' to a majority of the antisemitic stereotypes tested), compared to 37% for Hungary, 35% for Poland and 26% for Russia.[15]

Antisemitic rhetoric used by far-right activists relatively rarely translates into violent actions.[8][16] Between 2004 and 2014, there were 112 anti-Semitic violent attacks, with a decrease over time, in Ukraine.[8]

Historical memory

In April 2015, Ukraine passed four decommunization laws regulating official memory of the Soviet period. The laws ban Nazi and Communist ideology and symbols and the "public denial of the criminal nature of the Communist totalitarian regime 1917–1991"; they open former KGB archives; replace the Soviet term "great patriotic war" with the European second world war, and provide public recognition to anyone who fought for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century.[17] The laws represent attempts to reorient historical memory and pivot more decisively away from the Russian-Soviet narrative of the Soviet period, and in particular the World War II era.[18] They laws were criticized by intellectuals in Ukraine and abroad who argued that the laws limited freedom of speech.[18][19] The fourth bill in the package, "On the Legal Status and Honouring of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the Twentieth Century", has been particularly controversial because it covers a long list of individuals and organisations from human rights activists to fighters accused of committing crimes during World War II, including the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.[17][20][21][22]

Monuments in honor of members of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army such as Roman Shukhevych and Yaroslav Stetsko have been controversial and, in one case, earned official protest notes by Israel and Poland.[23][24]

Pro-Russian separatism

Файл:Far-right pro-Russian forces in the Russian-Ukrainian war.png
Flags of three far-right Russian separatist groups in Ukraine: Rusich, Russian National Unity, and the Russian Imperial Legion.

Шаблон:Further According to a 2016 report by French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), far-right Russian nationalism, neo-imperialism and Orthodox fundamentalism has shaped the official ideology of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics,[25] the two self-proclaimed states controlled by pro-Russian separatists but internationally recognized as part of Ukraine. During the Russo-Ukrainian War, especially at the beginning, far-right groups played an important role on the pro-Russian side, arguably more so than on the Ukrainian side.[26][27]

Members and former members of Russian National Unity (RNU), the National Bolshevik Party, the Eurasian Youth Union, and Cossack groups formed branches to recruit volunteers to join the separatists.[28][29][30][31] A former RNU member, Pavel Gubarev, was founder of the Donbas People's Militia and first "governor" of the Donetsk People's Republic.[28][32] RNU is particularly linked to the Russian Orthodox Army,[28] one of a number of separatist units described as "pro-Tsarist" and "extremist" Orthodox nationalists.[33] Neo-Nazi units such as the 'Rusich', 'Svarozhich' and 'Ratibor' battalions, use Slavic swastikas on their badges.[28] 'Rusich' is part of the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary group in Ukraine which has been linked to far-right extremism.[34][35]

Some of the most influential far-right nationalists among the Russian separatists are neo-imperialists, who seek to revive the Russian Empire.[28] These included Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin, first "minister of defence" of the Donetsk People's Republic, who espouses Russian neo-imperialism and ethno-nationalism.[28] The Russian Imperial Movement, a white supremacist militant group,[34] has recruited thousands of volunteers to join the separatists.[33] Some separatists have flown the black-yellow-white Russian imperial flag,[28] such as the Sparta Battalion. In 2014, volunteers from the National Liberation Movement joined the DPR People's Militia bearing portraits of Tsar Nicholas II.[29]

Other Russian volunteers involved in separatist militias included members of the Eurasian Youth Union, and of banned groups such as the Slavic Union and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration.[30] Another Russian separatist paramilitary unit, the Interbrigades, is made up of activists from the National Bolshevik (Nazbol) group Other Russia.[28]

Russian far-right groups gradually became less important in Donbas as the need for Russian radical nationalists faded.[28]

Ukrainian paramilitary units

Following the February 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Russia occupied Crimea, and armed detachments of Russians seized towns in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, and, by their claims, "pulled the trigger" of the Donbas War.[36] In response, several Ukrainian volunteer battalions formed to help the regular Ukrainian military. One of these self-funded volunteer militias was the Azov Battalion.[37][38] In 2014, some members of the battalion were reported as openly white supremacists.[39] Its first commander was Andriy Biletsky, the head of the ultra-nationalist and far right political groups Social-National Assembly and Patriots of Ukraine.[40][39] The battalion was taken under the command of the National Guard of Ukraine in 2015. In June 2015, United States Democratic Representative John Conyers and his Republican colleague Ted Yoho offered bipartisan amendments to prevent U.S. military training of the Azov Battalion—called a "neo-Nazi paramilitary militia" by Conyers and Yoho.[41][42][43]

While far-right volunteers played a role in the early stages of the Donbas War, their importance was often exaggerated, and both sides had less need to rely on them as the conflict progressed.[28] Alexander Ritzmann, a Senior Advisor to the Counter Extremism Project, wrote of the Azov Battalion: "when your country is under attack by foreign invaders, it is understandable that Ukrainians will not focus on the political views of their co-defenders, but on who can and will fight the invaders".[44]

American scholar and journalist Stephen F. Cohen wrote in The Nation in 2018 that the resurrection of Nazi ideology could be observed all around the globe, including Europe and the United States, but that the growing Ukrainian Neo-Nazi movement posed a special danger due to its well-armed and well-organized nature.[45] Cohen cited the Azov Battalion and Right Sector in this regard.[45] In 2020, Taras Kuzio criticized Cohen, noting research finding that these groups were largely made up of Russian speakers and national minorities. Kuzio says despite Cohen's claims, even Right Sector and the Azov Regiment that are often described as 'Ukrainian nationalist', included minorities such as Georgians, Jews, Russians, Tatars, and Armenians.[46]

British scholar Richard Sakwa wrote in 2015 that "The creation of the National Guard, consisting largely of far-right militants and others from the Maidan self-defence forces, had the advantage of removing these militants from the centre of Kyiv and other western Ukrainian towns, but they often lacked discipline and treated south-east Ukraine as occupied territory, regularly committing atrocities against civilians and captured 'terrorists'."Шаблон:Sfn

Far-right political parties

After Yanokovych's ouster in February 2014, the interim First Yatsenyuk government placed four Svoboda members in leading positions: Oleksandr Sych as Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine, Ihor Tenyukh as Minister of Defense, lawyer Ihor Shvaika as Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food and Andriy Mokhnyk as Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine; with the fall of the First Yatsenyuk government on 27 November 2014, Svoboda lost representation in the Ukrainian Government.[47][48] From 14 April 2016 to 29 August 2019, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament was Andriy Parubiy,[49][50] the co-founder of the SNPU; however, Parubiy left such organizations in 2004 and later joined moderate political parties, such as Our Ukraine, Batkivshchyna and the People's Front.[48][51]

In the 2019 Ukrainian elections, the far-right nationalist electoral alliance, including Svoboda, National Corps, Right Sector, Azov Battalion, OUN, and Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, under-performed expectations. In the presidential election, its candidate Ruslan Koshulynskyi received 1.6% of the vote, and in the parliamentary election, it was reduced to a single seat and saw its national vote fall to 2.15%, half of its result from 2014 and one-quarter of its result from 2012.[52][53]

Other far-right groups

See also

Notes

Шаблон:Reflist

References

Шаблон:Ethnic nationalism Шаблон:Europe topic

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  1. ↑ Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 861, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30.
  2. ↑ 2,0 2,1 2,2 2,3 Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 862, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30.
  3. ↑ Aram Terzyan: Towards Democratic Consolidation? Ukraine After the Revolution of Dignity. Open Political Science, 2020; 3: 183–191, p. 186. doi:10.1515/openps-2020-0015
  4. ↑ CEC counts 100 percent of vote in Ukraine's parliamentary elections, Ukrinform (26 July 2019)
    Шаблон:In lang Results of the extraordinary elections of the People's Deputies of Ukraine 2019, Ukrayinska Pravda (21 July 2019)
  5. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  6. ↑ Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 12, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30.
  7. ↑ 7,0 7,1 Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 876, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30.
  8. ↑ 8,0 8,1 8,2 8,3 8,4 8,5 8,6 Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 878, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30.
  9. ↑ Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak: The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right (Ed. Jens Rydgren). Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 879, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30.
  10. ↑ Andreas Umland & Anton Shekhovtsov (2013): "Ultraright Party Politics in Post-Soviet Ukraine and the Puzzle of the Electoral Marginalism of Ukrainian Ultranationalists in 1994–2009." Russian Politics and Law 51 (5), p. 47, doi:10.2753/RUP1061-1940510502.
  11. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  12. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  13. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  14. ↑ David Masci: Most Poles accept Jews as fellow citizens and neighbors, but a minority do not. Pew Research Center, March 28, 2018.
  15. ↑ ADL Global: Eastern Europe
  16. ↑ Lenka Bustikov (2015): "Voting, Identity and Security Threats in Ukraine: Who Supports the Radical 'Freedom' Party?" Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2), pp. 239–256, doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.06.011.
  17. ↑ 17,0 17,1 Шаблон:Cite web
  18. ↑ 18,0 18,1 Шаблон:Cite journal
  19. ↑ Шаблон:Cite journal
  20. ↑ Шаблон:Cite news
  21. ↑ Шаблон:Cite webШаблон:Dead link
  22. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  23. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  24. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  25. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  26. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  27. ↑ Шаблон:Cite book
  28. ↑ 28,0 28,1 28,2 28,3 28,4 28,5 28,6 28,7 28,8 28,9 Шаблон:Cite web
  29. ↑ 29,0 29,1 Шаблон:Cite journal
  30. ↑ 30,0 30,1 Шаблон:Cite news
  31. ↑ Шаблон:Cite book
  32. ↑ Snyder, Timothy. Far-Right Forces are Influencing Russia's Actions in Crimea. The New Republic. 17 March 2014.
  33. ↑ 33,0 33,1 Шаблон:Cite book
  34. ↑ 34,0 34,1 Шаблон:Cite news
  35. ↑ Шаблон:Cite journal
  36. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  37. ↑ "Azov fighters are Ukraine's greatest weapon and may be its greatest threat". The Guardian. 10 September 2014.
  38. ↑ "German TV Shows Nazi Symbols on Helmets of Ukraine Soldiers". NBC News.
  39. ↑ 39,0 39,1 "Ukraine crisis: the neo-Nazi brigade fighting pro-Russian separatists". The Daily Telegraph. 11 August 2014.
  40. ↑ "Ukraine conflict: 'White power' warrior from Sweden". BBC News. 16 July 2014.
  41. ↑ "Ukraine's Neo-Nazis Won't Get U.S. Money". Bloomberg. 12 June 2015.
  42. ↑ "US lifts ban on funding 'neo-Nazi' Ukrainian militia". The Jerusalem Post. 18 January 2016.
  43. ↑ "Congress Has Removed a Ban on Funding Neo-Nazis From Its Year-End Spending Bill Шаблон:Webarchive". The Nation. 14 January 2016.
  44. ↑ Шаблон:Cite news
  45. ↑ 45,0 45,1 Stephen F. Cohen America's Collusion With Neo-Nazis. Neo-fascists play an important official or tolerated role in US-backed Ukraine Шаблон:Webarchive The Nation, 2018
  46. ↑ Шаблон:Cite book
  47. ↑ "Ukraine's revolution and the far right". BBC News. 7 March 2014.
  48. ↑ 48,0 48,1 "How the far-right took top posts in Ukraine's power vacuum". Channel 4. 5 March 2014.
  49. ↑ Rada appoints Andriy Parubiy its speaker Шаблон:Webarchive, Interfax-Ukraine (14 April 2016)
  50. ↑ "Deputy Chairman of Ukraine's parliament in Washington to present list of weapons Ukraine needs". Ukraine Today. 25 February 2015.
  51. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  52. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
  53. ↑ Шаблон:Cite web
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